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INTEGRATING GOVERNMENTAL AND OFFICER
TORT LIABILITY
GEORGE A. BERIWANN *
INTRODUCTION

The legislative and judicial dismantling of sovereign immunity is among
the more significant and celebrated reforms of recent American administrative law.' In many instances, this development has given those seeking
damages for wrongful governmental action their first and only defendant.
Even in situations in which litigants already had a cause of action against
individual public officials, making the government amenable to suit has
enhanced the chances of actual recovery, since officials often lack the
means to satisfy judgments rendered against them.2 The immunity from
liability enjoyed by public officials also has undergone a complex series of
changes. 3 Though still in flux, this controversial area of the law today
finds officials exposed to a considerable risk of personal liability for the
wrongs they commit in connection with their performance of duty.
Although these developments might have gone even further in lowering
the shield of immunity from the government and its officers, they represent a
*Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., Yale University,
1967; J.D., Yale University, 1971; LL.M., Columbia University, 1975. The author wishes to
acknowledge the research assistance of Miroslav M. Fajt, a second-year student at Columbia
Law School.
1. See generally K. DAvis, ADmiNisTRATIvE LAW OF THE SEvEm'ms ch. 25 (1976)
LAw §§ 198, 200
[hereinafter cited as K. DAvIs, SEvEirrms]; B. ScswARTz, ADMmsRATr
(1976); Carrow, Sovereign Immunity in Administrative Law-A New Diagnosis, 9 J. PUB. L. 1
(1960); Cobey, The New California Governmental Tort Liability Statutes, 1 H Rv. J. LEGis. 16
(1965); David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity from Liability or
Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1959); Jacoby, Roads to the Demise of the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, 29 AD. L. REv. 265 (1977); Peterson, Governmental Immunity: Has a Change
Finally Come?, W. ST. U. L. REV. 209 (1975); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:
Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963); Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, Public Policy]; Vanlandingham, Local Governmental
Immunity Re-examined, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 237 (1966).
2. See, e.g., S. Rne. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
AD. NEWS 2789, 2790.

3. See generally Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine, 59 HAv. L. REv. 1060 (1946); David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12
S. CAL. L. REv. 127, 260, 368 (1939); Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MNcH.
L. REV. 201 (1956); Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALI. L. REv. 303 (1959);
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Hnv. L. REv. 209 (1963);
James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610 (1955);
Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1937); Keefe,
Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 FoaRDHm L. REv. 130 (1943); McManis,
Personal Liability of State Officials under State and Federal Law, 9 GA. L. REv. 821 (1975);
Nelson & Avnaim, Claims Against a California Governmental Entity or Employee, 6 Sw.
U. L. REv. 550 (1974); Van Alstyne, Claims Against Public Employees: More Chaos in
California Law, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 497 (1961); Vaughn, The Personal Accountability of
Public Employees, 25 Am. U. L. REV. 85 (1975); Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 H.4_v. L. REv. 1065 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Note, Federal
Executive Immunity from Civil Liability in Damages: A Reevaluation of Barr v. Matteo, 77
CoLum. L. Rav. 625 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Federal Executive Immunity].
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blessing for the victims of official wrongdoing. However, the emerging
coexistence of governmental and officer liability has created a new problem
of coordination. Without attempting to define the proper scope of liability
for harm arising out of governmental activity, this Article explores various
aspects of the coordination problem. After briefly sketching recent developments in governmental and officer immunity, and discussing the need for a
coherent system of governmental tort law, I shall examine various ways of
integrating governmental and officer tort liability so as to accommodate the
purposes that the law of governmental torts may appropriately be asked to
serve. A brief look will be taken in this connection at the approaches to
the problem that have been adopted in French and German law.
I.

Tim

SHIFTING BACKGROUND OF IMMUNITY

A.

The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Although a variety of arguments have been advanced for immunizing
the government from suit without its consent, 4 the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has been justified on the practical ground that satisfying private
claims against the state would cause an intolerable drain on public funds
and interfere with the effective functioning of government.6 However,
recent reflection has led to the view that such fears are exaggerated and that
in any event asking innocent victims to bear alone the losses inflicted upon
them through governmental activity is fundamentally unfair.6 Today, the
cost of compensating for mavy such losses is regarded as an ordinary expense
of government to be borne indirectly by all who benefit from the services that
government provides.
By enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Congress made the
United States liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances." '7 However, this general waiver of
immunity from tort liability excludes claims "based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 8 Although Congress
4. For historical background of the sovereign immunity doctrine, see Jaffe, supra note 3;
James, supra note 3, at 611-13. According to Justice Holmes, "A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
5. See 2 F. HAEtR & F. JAmZs, THm LAw oF TORTS, 1611-12 (1956).
6. See id. at 1612. See also Professor Borchard's seminal discussions of sovereign immunity
entitled Governmental Responsibility in Tort: I-VII, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924); 36
YALE L.. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); 28 CoLtrm. L. REv. 577, 735 (1928). The availability to public
entities of relatively inexpensive liability insurance has greatly eased the transition from

immunity to liability.

7. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). The Act also contains an exemption for certain intentional
torts. Id. § 2680(h).
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was willing in principle to have the federal government pay for most of the
harm its employees might inflict through garden-variety negligence in carrying out their duties, it sought through this exception to preserve the
sovereign's immunity from tort claims arising out of conscious governmental
decisionmaking. The courts traditionally have read the exception broadly. 10
The states have surrendered their sovereign immunity in a bewildering
variety of ways. A great many state legislatures have enacted some sort of
general waiver of immunity. 1 In most other states, the doctrine has largely
been abrogated by the courts. 12 Even in the jurisdictions whose courts have
refused, despite legislative inaction, to take matters into their own hands, 3
the shield of common law immunity seems to be perforated with a haphazard
collection of narrow statutory exceptions. 14 Although legislative waivers
of governmental immunity differ widely from state to state,' 5 most state
statutes, like the Federal Tort Claims Act, distinguish between discretionary
and nondiscretionary acts.' 6 Where such a distinction is not explicitly drawn,
courts frequently infer it.17
Courts on both the federal and state levels have tended recently to
reduce the scope of the discretionary acts exception. Some have explicitly
rejected the idea that the exercise of a degree of judgment should in itself
immunize the government; they would limit the exception to policy decisions
that define the public interest in some basic way.' 8 The continuing erosion
9. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, supra note 5, at 1657-58. On the distinction between
injury arising through accident and that imposed as a result of the deliberate exercise of
governmental authority intended to alter an individual's position, see Jaffe, supra note 3, at 212.
10. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See generally W. GELLHORN
& C. BysE, ADMImISRATIVE LAW 370-73 & nn.6 & 7 (6th ed. 1974).
11. See K. DAvis, SavmrNa s, supra note 1, at § 25.00-1.
12. See id. at § 25.00.
13. See id. at §§ 25.00-.00-2.
14. See W. PROSSm, HANDBOOK OF TE LAw OF TORTS 975 (4th ed. 1971); Note,
Governmental Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present Need for Change and Prospects
for the Future, 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 521 (1976).
15. Important areas in which statutes differ include the governmental unit exposed to
liability, see, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815 (West 1966) (all public entities); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 662-2 (1968) (state government only); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1753 (West Supp. 1978)
(municipalities only), the exemptions enjoyed by such units, see K. DAvis, SEvENTIEs, supra
note 1, at §§ 25.00-1, 25.13; B. ScHwARrz, supra note 1, at 568-69, and the ceilings (if any)
on the amounts that plaintiffs may recover, see, e.g., MwN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.736(4), 466.04
(West 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.270 (1975). Moreover,
some states have established special boards or courts of claims to decide damage claims
against the government. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-142, 4-160 (West Supp. 1978);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 439.1, 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Macm ComI'. LAws ANN.
§ 600.6419 (1968).
16. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(b)

(Bums Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3(a) (West 1977); TEN. CODE ANN. §23-3311(1)

(Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1) (1968).
17. See, e.g., Boucher v. Fuhlbruck, 26 Conn. Supp. 79, 213 A.2d 455 (1965); Charles 0.
Desch, Inc. v. State, 50 App. Div. 2d 253, 377 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1975); King v. City of Seattle,
84 Wash.2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
18. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064-65 (3d Cir. 1974); Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d
585, 598 (5th Cir. 1973); Breed v. Shaner, 45 U.S.L.W. 2510 (D. Hawaii 1977). See also
Jones v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 275, 280-81, 307 N.E.2d 236, 238, 352 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172-73 (1973).
But see Wright v. United States, 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1977).
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of sovereign immunity has greatly enhanced the prospects of recovering
damages from the government for the torts committed by its agents. Nevertheless, governmental liability has had its limits and will almost certainly
continue to have them. As long as this is the case, plaintiffs will be tempted
to join individual officials as defendants in governmental tort litigation
if permitted to do so.
B.

Individual Officer Immunity

Compared to sovereign immunity, the exemption from liability enjoyed
by individual public officials has followed a highly erratic course. Over a
relatively short period, the law has fluctuated between one extreme solution
and another, without settling for too long at any one position. Matters
today are still not entirely resolved.'0
The restlessness of the courts on the question of officer immunity
reflects conflicting policy considerations. On the one hand, wrongdoing
seems worth deterring or punishing whatever hat the wrongdoer happens
to wear. Moreover, there is something anomalous about denying relief to a
tort victim simply because he had the added misfortune of being injured
by a public official rather than a private citizen. Thus, the common law
traditionally did not distinguish between public officials and private individuals for purposes of determining the scope of personal tort liability. In
fact, courts that drew such a distinction often imposed a stricter standard of
care on officials than on private individuals, holding them personally liable
for the consequences of simple non-negligent mistakes.20
More recently, however, the courts have recognized that the threat of
personal liability may make public officials unduly fearful in their exercise
of authority and discourage them from taking prompt and decisive action.21
This concern, which rests upon the plausible though undocumented assumption that such burdens cannot be imposed upon individual officials without
breeding an unhealthy timidity on their part,22 has led many courts to
accord administrative officials at least a qualified immunity that would relieve
them of liability for the reasonable and good faith exercise of discretion
within the scope of their authority. 23 Limiting immunity to discretionary
functions follows from the premise that fear of personal liability can inhibit
conduct only when there is room for judgment in deciding whether or how
19. See Federal Executive Immunity, supra note 3.
20. See, e.g., Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891) (Holmes, J.). See
generally W. GELLHORN & C. Bysa, supra note 10, at 335-38; Keefe, supra note 3, and cases
cited therein.
21. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959); Expeditions Unltd. Aquatic Enterprises,
Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc).
22. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 590 (1959), described this
assumption as a "gossamer web self-spun without a scintilla of support to which one can point."
23. See, e.g., Stiebitz v. Mahoney, 144 Conn. 443, 447-48, 134 A.2d 71, 74 (1957);
Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga. App. 615, 137 S.E.2d 77 (1965); Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass.
800, 820, 298 N.E.2d 847, 858-59 (1973); Morrill County v. Bliss, 125 Neb. 97, 111, 249 N.V.
98, 104 (1933).
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to act.2 4 In "ministerial" matters in which officials are thought to have no
such discretion this fear is somewhat naively assumed to have no inhibiting

effect.25 At the federal level, public officials have acquired an absolute
immunity to ordinary tort suits which prevents inquiries even into allegations
of corruption or malice. 26 However, since federal officials enjoy only a

qualified immunity for constitutional torts, 27 their degree of exposure to
28
liability varies with the theory on which the tort claim is based.
Although discussion of officer immunity has been dominated by the

presumed impact of liability upon the performance by public officials of
their discretionary functions, the case for immunity is strengthened by other
considerations which apply to discretionary and nondiscretionary action alike.
Holding public officials personally liable for all the consequences of their
actions may be unfair. In the first place, the law often affirmatively requires
officials, unlike private citizens, to take action associated with a strong likelihood of injury to others. 29 Certain high-risk services-fire and police

protection, for example-have virtually no private law counterpart. Second,
some governmental action is peculiarly inclined to affect the lives and
fortunes of thousands of people. Concepts such as proximate cause, which
enable courts to adjust the scope of liability in tort cases, may fail to protect
officials from crushing financial burdens in cases involving many claimants.
That these added objections to personal liability would seem to apply to
nondiscretionary as well as discretionary action has not prevented most
courts from confining officer immunity to acts of the latter kind. Thus, it
seems that the courts are troubled chiefly by the danger of bridling the free
exercise of judgment by public officials.30
24. See generally W. Pi~ossER, supra note 14, at 988-89.
25. See generally David, supra note 3, at 152, 283-84; Jaffe, supra note 3, at 218.
26. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1959); Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d 790
(1st Cir. 1975); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981
(1965); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938). A
similar immunity exists in California. See White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209, cert.
denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1951).
27. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding police officers personally liable in damages for fourth
amendment violations committed in the course of conducting an arrest or search, unless they
can show that they acted "in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity" of their
action). For cases predicating constitutional torts on the violation of other constitutional
guarantees, see Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975) (fourteenth amendment); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975) (fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments);
Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (fourth and fifth amendments).
28. Frequently, both common law and constitutional tort claims are raised in the same
case. See, e.g., Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1976); Paton v. La Prade,
524 F.2d 862, 866-67 (3d Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
29. See Van Alstyne, Public Policy, supra note 1, at 468-69; CAs.nLoRlNrA LAW REvisIoN
COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMuNrrY 810 (1963).

30. Courts are particularly disturbed by the fact that officials who are invited to exercise
discretion may later be held liable because a judge or jury disagrees with their action. See
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 505-11, 475 P.2d
78, 88-90 (1970). See generally Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity
for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889, 912-14 (1965).
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The dramatic rise in recent years in the number and scale of civil
damage actions against government officials has heightened concern over the
implications of officer liability.3 1 Nevertheless, the courts continue to disagree
on how best to resolve the tension between society's interest in compensating
its injured and in keeping public officials unafraid. Thus they remain
divided over the kind of immunity that public officials should enjoy. This
division is especially apparent on the federal level. Influenced by scholarly
82
criticism, as well as by the acceptance of qualified immunity in state law
and in federal civil rights88 and constitutional tort 4 actions, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in Economou v.
United States Department of AgricultureM that federal administrative officials
are no longer entitled to absolute immunity from liability. The court found
that immunizing officials only when they act in good faith and with a
reasonable belief in the lawfulness of their action offers them adequate
protection, and that the added security that absolute immunity would provide
does not justify denying relief to the victims of bad faith or unreasonable
conduct.38 Shortly thereafter, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a similar position,"7 but
that court, upon rehearing the case en banc, subsequently decided to reaffirm

the rule of absolute immunity.88 Since the Economou decision itself vill be
reviewed by the Supreme Court during its current Term, 39 clarification of
federal law in this regard may soon be expected.

31. See Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 151 n.18 (E.D. Va. 1977); Hearings on
Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 1977 Before Subcomms. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 546, 559-60 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Supplemental AppropriationsHearings);Marro, When Officials are Sued, Who Should Defend Them?,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1977, § 4 (News of the Week in Review) at 5, col. 4.
32. See, e.g., Paoli v. Mason, 325 Ill. App. 197, 59 N.E.2d 499 (1945); State ex rel.
Robertson v. Farmers' State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 39 S.W.2d 281 (1931).
33. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). These cases were brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970), according to which any person acting "under color of" state law is liable in
damages for depriving any other person of his constitutional or civil rights. They make the
immunity of each public official from liability under § 1983 depend upon a balance between
impairment of his performance as a result of his exposure to liability, on the one hand, and
the remedial purposes of the statute, on the other. The incongruity between the absolute
immunity under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), and the qualified immunity applicable
to § 1983 actions has been noted by the courts. See, e.g., Expeditions Unltd. Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en bane) (Robinson, J.,
concurring). See generally Developments, supra note 3, at 1155-56.
34. See note 27 supra.

35. 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Butz v. Economou, 429 U.S.
1089 (1977) (No. 76-709).
36. Id. at 696.
37. Expeditions Unltd. Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., No. 74-1899 (D.C.
Cir. June 28, 1976).
38. Expeditions Unltd. Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (en bane).
39. Butz v. Economou, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977), granting cert. to 553 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.
1976). This may also provide an occasion for the Supreme Court to address itself to the
problem of the incongruity between the immunity standards applicable to the same official in
common law and constitutional tort cases. See note 27 and acqompanying text supra,
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THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENTAL TORT LAW

Because the doctrines of sovereign and officer immunity spring from

distinct, if related, concerns, each has evolved independently. This continuing dissociation is not limited to jurisdictions that still lack general legislation on governmental tort liability. 40 Even when legislatures undertake to
restructure governmental tort law from the bottom up, they tend to leave
officer liability curiously out of the picture in important respects.
A.

The Coexistence of Governmental and Officer Liability

In the first place, few statutory waivers of sovereign immunity address
the threshold question of whether the introduction of governmental liability

has the effect of immunizing the individual official. 41 Many state statutes say
nothing on the subject,4 though if litigation under the Federal Tort Claims
Act is any guide, the courts will probably interpret them as leaving public
officials exposed to personal liability. 43 Most statutes that deal with officer
liability do so only obliquely by authorizing or requiring the government to
purchase liability insurance on behalf of its officers and employees, 44 to
40. For an outline of the states' varying statutory responses to this issue, see K. DAVIs,
SENTmS, supra note 1, at 554-56.
41. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820 (West 1966) (official still liable); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 4-165 (West Supp. 1978) (no suits against officials except for "wanton or willful"
misconduct); FLA. STAT. ANx. §768.28(9) (West Supp. 1976) (officials liable only if they
acted "in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
disregard of human rights, safety, or property"); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:3-1, -14 (West Supp.
1977) (common law officer liability continues; nothing in statute meant to exonerate official
for criminal activity, "actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct"); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3322 (Supp. 1977) (officials generally not subject to suit for damages for which governmental entity is liable); T)3. Crv. CODE tit. 6252-19, § 15 (Vernon 1970) (common law
immunity continues).
42. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1977); HAw. REv. STAT. § 662-2 (Supp. 1975);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MicH. CoMI'. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.6419 (1968); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1753 (West Supp. 1977).
43. See D. SCHWARTZ & S. JAcoBY, LTIGATION WrrH THE FEDERAL GOVNUMENT
§ 14.106 at 233 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL LITGATION]. The provision of the Federal
Tort Claims Act to the effect that "judgment in an action under [the Act] shall constitute
a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against
the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim," 28 U.S.C.
§ 2676 (1970), strongly suggests that, until judgment, suit may be brought against the officer.
Where independent federal jurisdiction exists, plaintiff may join the official as party
defendant to a suit brought in federal district court against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. See Benbow v. Wolf, 217 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1954). Cf. Morris v.
United States, 521 F.2d 872, (9th Cir. 1975); Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951, 953-54
(9th Cir. 1969) (supporting joinder rule but finding no independent federal jurisdiction
existed). See generally W. PRossER, supra note 14, § 47, at 295-96. One complication of
Ioinder on the federal level is that a jury trial may be necessary with respect to the claim
against the official, but not with respect to the claim against the government. See 28 U.S.C.
§2402 (1970). This may lead on occasion to inconsistent verdicts. See D. ScwARTz
& S. JAconY, GovERNmENT LITGATION 503 (1963) [hereinafter cited as GOVRNMENTr
LmoATION].
The fact that a litigant has sued the official and obtained a judgment against him is
not a bar to suing the government on a similar claim in a later action, though satisfaction
of either judgment operates to satisfy the other. See Moon v. Price, 213 F.2d 794 (5th
Cir. 1954); United States v. First Sec. Bank, 208 F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir. 1953).
44. For provisions authorizing the purchase of such insurance, see IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-16.5-18 (Burns Supp. 1977); IowA CODE ANN. § 613A.7 (West Supp. 1977);
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provide individual defendants with a free defense in damage suits arising
40
45
out of their official action, or to pay judgments rendered against them.
Assuming that the advent of governmental liability does not bar litigants
from suing public officials in their individual capacity, a number of important
procedural questions arise. If a prospective plaintiff must give the government formal notice of his tort claim before bringing suit against it, must he
also notify the government when he intends to sue one of its officers or
employees instead? 47 Do special courts or commissions that have been
established to decide governmental tort claims have jurisdiction over actions
against individual officials arising out of the same set of facts, and if so, is
that jurisdiction concurrent or exclusive?48 Few statutes answer such
questions.

B.

The Coextensivenessof Governmental and Officer Tort Liability

The more difficult problem is whether the liability of public officials
should be coextensive as well as coexistent with governmental liability. The
solution depends not only upon whether the action is regarded as tortious
irrespective of whom the plaintiff chooses to sue, but also upon how the
term "scope of authority" is defined and whether the term "discretionary"
is given the same meaning for purposes of both governmental and officer
immunity. Unfortunately, few tort claims statutes take any position on
49
these points.
Nsv. Rev. STAT. § 41.038 (1977); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 52 (MeKinney 1977); OKLA.
STAT. AN. tit. 11, § 1757 (West 1976); Trx. Civ. CODE Am. tit. 6252-19, § 9 (Vernon
1970). For provisions requiring the purchase of such insurance, see IDAHo CODE § 6-919

(Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 35.9(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN.

tit.
29, § 1401 (1970).
45. For examples of legislation authorizing the government to defend its officers, see
FLA. STAT. ANrN. § 111.07 (West 1975) (except for action taken "in bad faith, with malicious
purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety,
or property"); Mici. Coap. LAWS ANN. § 691.1408 (1968); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 466.07(1),
(2) (West 1977) (except for "malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of duty");
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 17(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-300.3,
300.4(a) (2) (1974) (except for "actual fraud, corruption or actual malice"). For examples
of statutes requiring the government to do so, see IDAHO CODE § 6-903(b), (c) (Supp. 1977)
(except for conduct showing "malice or criminal intent"); IoWA CODE ANN. §§25A.21,
613A.8 (West Supp. 1977); OR. Rev. STAT. §§30.285(3), 30.287(1) (1975) (except for
"malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of duty"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 1101(a)
(Supp. 1977); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. §4.92.070 (Supp. 1976) (only for "good faith"
conduct).
46. For examples of legislation authorizing the government to pay judgments against
its officers, see ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 85, §2-302 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE ANN.
§34-4-16.5-5(b) (Bums Supp. 1977); MicH. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. §691.1408 (1968). For
provisions requiring the government to do so, see note 97 infra.
47. See, e.g., Schiavone v. Nassau County, 41 N.Y. 2d 844, 362 N.E.2d 252, 393
N.Y.S.2d 701 (1977); Fitzgerald v. Sanitation Dist. No. 6, 89 Misc. 2d 1078, 393 N.Y.S.2d
542 (City. Ct. 1977). See generally CALIFORNiA LAW REvisIoN COMM'N, supra note 29, at
1016-17. A few statutes provide a specific answer to the question. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.736(5) (West 1977).
48. For recent examples of litigation over this question, see Abbott v. Secretary of
State, 67 Mich. App. 344, 240 N.W.2d 800 (1976); DeVivo v. Grosjean, 48 App. Div.2d
158, 368 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1975).
49. See, e.g., ALAsxA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1976). Under statutes which immunize the
government from liability whenever the official involved is immune, the term "discretionary,"
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The matter is further complicated by the fact that nearly every general
waiver of governmental immunity contains, in addition to a broad discre-

tionary acts exemption, a list of specific tort claims that remain barred. 50

With a few exceptions, state tort claims statutes do not indicate what
bearing such exemptions have upon the common law immunity of public
officials.5 1 In the absence of legislative guidance, the courts have gone in
different directions on this basic issue. Some, insisting on a strict separation

between governmental and officer liability, deny individual officials any
benefit of the government's statutory immunities. 52 This might lead to the
curious result of holding an official personally liable for the good faith
execution of a statute, even though the jurisdiction's tort claims statute
immunizes the government against precisely such a claim.53 Other courts
have gone to the opposite extreme by assuming an almost axiomatic correlation between the exemptions from governmental and officer liability. In a
few instances, this assumption may be justified by statutory language
suggesting that the government should enjoy immunity whenever its officials
4
enjoy it,5
or vice versa.5 5 But some courts have adopted this view without
the benefit of statutory guidance,5 6 and usually without addressing the
policy issues involved.
Even in the absence of any statutory framework, a few courts have
made serious attempts to coordinate governmental and officer liability. The
by definition, has the same meaning in both contexts. See, e.g., CAIL. Gov'T CoDE
§ 815.2(b) (West 1966). For a recent judicial suggestion that the term might be defined
differently depending upon whether governmental or officer immunity is at stake, see Smith
v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 497, 501, 475 P.2d. 78, 84, 86 (1970).
50. Among the more common examples are exclusions of liability in connection with
the inspection of real property, see, e.g., NJ. STAT. AnN. § 59:3-7 (West Supp. 1977), the
issuance of licenses, see, e.g., id. § 59:3-6, and the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute
or regulation, see, e.g., id. § 59:3-4.
51. See, e.g., Ar.AsKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1976); HAw. RaV. STAT. §§ 662-14, -15 (Supp.
1975). But see IND. CoDE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1977) (setting forth a list of
exclusions common to both governmental and officer liability). See also MNr.STAT. ANN.
§ 3.736(3) (West 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:2-3, 3-2 (West Supp. 1977); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.265(3) (1975).
52. See Boyer v. Chaloux, 288 F. Supp. 366, 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); Tocco v. Piersante,
69 Mich. App. 616, 621, 245 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1976); Rhynders v. Greene, 255 App. Div.
401, 402, 8 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1938); Fiebinger v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 1007,
1010-11, 51 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (Sup. Ct. 1944). On the other hand, the courts have also held
that legislative abrogation of governmental immunity does not necessarily imply abrogation of
officer immunity as well. See Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 494-95, 475 P.2d 78, 83 (1970).
53. See Henke, Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability Law from a National Perspective,
48 ORE. L. REv. 95, 121 (1968) (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 30.265(d) (1975) and Gearin v.
Marion County, 110 Or. 390, 396-97, 223 P. 929, 931-32 (1924)).
54. See, e.g., Thiele v. Kennedy, 18 Ill. App. 3d 465, 467, 309 N.E.2d 394, 395-96 (1974)
(citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-109 (Smith-Hurd 1966)); Blanchard v. Town of Kearny,
145 N.J. Super. 246, 249, 367 A.2d 464, 465-66 (Law Div. 1976) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:2-2(b) (West Supp. 1977)).
55. This would seem to be the import of tort claims statutes giving equal treatment to
damage actions whether brought against the state or against its officers. See, e.g., IowA CoDn
ANN. § 25A.2(5) (West Supp. 1977).
56. See, e.g., Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash.2d 882, 885, 410 P.2d 606, 608 (1966).
See generally Jaffe, supra note 3, at 213. Some courts have suggested that if the government is exposed to liability, its officers should be exposed to liability as well. See, e.g.,
Foyster v. Tutuska, 44 Misc.2d 303, 304-05, 253 N.Y.S.2d 634, 636-37 (Brie County Ct. 1964),
rev'd on other grounds, 25 App. Div. 2d 940, 270 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1966).
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decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Carter v. Carlson 7 illustrates
the magnitude of the task. In that case, plaintiff, alleging that he had been
arrested by a District of Columbia police officer without probable cause
and then beaten with brass knuckles, sued the officer, who was never found
for service of process, his precinct captain, the Chief of Police, and the
District of Columbia. In reversing the district court's summary dismissal,
Judge Bazelon observed for the majority that common law immunity for
discretionary acts does not extend to torts committed by police officers in
the course of making an arrest."" However, since the arresting officer was
not a party, the court turned immediately to the possible liability of the
captain and Chief of Police. In keeping with the common law rule, it held
that they would be entitled to immunity only if their supervision and
training of the officer amounted to discretionary action, a matter to be
decided by the district court.6 9
The court then examined the liability of the sovereign, the District of
Columbia. It observed that while the District's direct liability for inadequately training or supervising police officers likewise depended upon the
discretionary nature of those responsibilities, 60 the District might also be
vicariously liable for the torts of its officials. On this point, the court took
the categorical view that if an arresting officer is not immune from liability
for the torts he commits in making an arrest, then the government employing
him should not be immune from liability for them either: "If the arresting
officer himself is subject to suit for his tort, it is hard to conceive of any
substantial additional threat to the efficiency of government that would result
from subjecting the District to suit as well."' 1
Finally, the court considered the government's potential vicarious
liability for the conduct of the captain and Chief of Police. It held first
that, as in the case of the arresting officer, if the captain or Chief of Police
were liable, the District of Columbia should automatically be liable as well.
In its view, if the threat of personal liability did not impair the officers'
performance of duty, the threat of governmental liability could not do so. 02
But the court went still further, suggesting that the lower court might still
hold the District of Columbia vicariously liable for the actions of the captain
57. 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
58. Id. at 362-63.
59. Id. at 364. The court noted that even if the captain or chief were protected from
liability at common law, they might both be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
for deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, since that statute does not imply a broad
common law immunity for all government officers exercising discretionary functions. Id.
at 365. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on this point, holding that the
District of Columbia is not a "State or Territory" within the meaning of § 1983. District
of Columbia v. Carter. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
60. 447 F.2d at 358.
61. Id. at 366.
62. Id. at 367.

19771

GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY

1185

and Chief even if they were found to enjoy personal immunity. This
depended upon a policy judgment to be made by the lower court:
With respect to some government functions, the threat of individual
liability would have a devastating effect, while the threat of government liability would not significantly impair performance.
If the trial court determines that this is such a case, then the
officers, but not the District, will be entitled to immunity at
common law. 68
A second notable effort at integrating governmental and officer liability
was made by the California Supreme Court in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District.6" In that case, a superintendent of schools brought
a damage action against the school district and three of its trustees alleging
in part that the trustees had made defamatory statements concerning her
official conduct to the press, to members of the public, and to government
officials engaged in investigating charges of misconduct against her. The
court ruled that the trustees' cooperation in the investigation was a discretionary activity entitling them to absolute immunity from suit.65 Nevertheless, it held that they might still be liable with respect to statements made
to the press and public, since making those statements lay beyond the scope
of their authority. 66 On the other hand, precisely for that reason, the school
67
district could not be made to answer for them.
Significantly, as in Carter, the court advanced the converse proposition
that the government might be liable for injury caused by its officials even
when the latter are personally immune. It considered it "unlikely that
officials would be as adversely affected in the performance of their duties by
the fear of liability on the part of their employing agency as by the fear of
personal liability." 68 However, the court ultimately decided to extend
immunity to the school district. While it did not explain this decision, the
court presumably feared that exposing the district to liability would have too
69
adverse an effect on the trustees.
Although the Carter and Lipman opinions squarely confront the
problem of the coextensiveness of governmental and officer liability, they do
not offer entirely satisfactory solutions. On the first issue-whether the
63. Id. Recognizing the "conceptual difficulty with the notion of imposing vicarious
liability on the District for the conduct of officers who are not themselves subject to liability,"
Judge Bazelon noted that under principles of respondeat superior, a master may assert
his servant's substantive defenses, but not his immunity to suit. Id. at 367 n.26.
64. 55 Cal2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961). The decision was rendered
on the same day that the court discarded the state's common law rule of sovereign immunity.
See Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
65. Id. at 230, 233, 359 P.2d at 467, 469-70, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99, 101-02.
66. Id. at 234, 359 P.2d at 470, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
67. Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 468, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
68. Id. at 229-30, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
69. "There is a vital public interest in securing free and independent judgment of
school trustees in dealing with personnel problems, and trustees, being responsible for the
fiscal well-being of their districts, would be especially sensitive to the financial consequences
of suits for damages against the districts." Id.
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existence of officer liability necessarily implies governmental liability-the
California court, but not the District of Columbia Circuit, expressly
excepted the situation in which a public official acts beyond the scope
of his authority. 70 While the meaning of the term "scope of authority" for
these purposes is less than clear, some such exclusion is useful in relieving
the government of liability where its connection to the tort is too remote.7 1
Moreover, the District of Columbia Circuit assumed without discussion that
the government should not be relieved of liability simply because the
72official acted willfully or wantonly within the scope of his authority.
The Lipman Court did not entertain the question. Although we may
ultimately conclude that the government should be liable even in such
situations, 73 the matter deserves more careful consideration. Finally, there
may be independent reasons in a given case for limiting or excluding governmental liability that have little if anything to do with the danger of
inhibiting public officials. Such reasons include fiscal considerations and the
7
inappropriateness of judicial involvement in political decisionmaking. 4
Any automatic inference of governmental liability from officer liability may
obscure such factors.
The converse position adopted by both the Carter and Lipman courts
-that under certain circumstances the government should be liable for the
torts committed by its officers though the officers themselves are not liablerests on firmer ground. 75 Even if we may assume that the prospect of gov70. Because the defendants in Carter did not allege that the arresting officer had
acted beyond the scope of his authority, the issue was not reached. See 447 F.2d at 361.
71. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959). Whether the Lipnan
court decided the "scope of authority" issue properly is of course another matter. For
example, it apparently gave no consideration to the question of whether the trustees knew
or reasonably should have known that making statements about the superintendent to the
press and public exceeded the scope of their authority. However great the need for compensation in any given case, it may be unfair to impose exclusive liability on the individual
officer for honest and excusable misjudgments of this kind.
72. According to Judge Bazelon, "When a tort is made possible only through the abuse
of power granted by the government, then the government should be held accountable for the
abuse, whether it is negligent or intentional in character." 447 F.2d at 366.
73. The view that a master may be held vicariously liable for the intentional torts of
his servants has gained broad acceptance. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 5, at
§§26.9, 29.13; W. PROSSER, supra note 14, §70, at 464-66; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY §§245-49 (1958).
74. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, § 29.15, at 1661-65.
75. In recent years, a number of other courts have adopted this view. See, e.g.,
Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 998 (6th Cir. 1975); Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth.,
375 P.2d 696 (Alas. 1962); Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 8, 274 N.E.2d 321, 326
(1971), rev'd on other grounds, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1052 (1972). Cf. Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 493-95, 475 P.2d 78, 82-83 (1970)
(by implication). However, shortly after the Lipman decision, the California Law Revision
Commission urged the legislature to immunize the government explicitly from liability whenever
its officers and employees are immune. Such a provision was included in the state's new tort
claims legislation. CA.. GOV'T COD § 815.2(b) (West 1966). For similar provisions, see ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-109 (Smith-Hurd 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-2(b) (West Supp. 1977).
In a recent decision holding that the government would be liable for the constitutional
torts of law enforcement officers, even though the latter might be immune, the court relied
heavily on legislative history of the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
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ernmental liability in damages will trouble any official who is sensitive
to the disfavor of his superiors, it should not dampen his zeal nearly as
much as the prospect of personal liability. Unless the government's exposure
to liability can genuinely be expected to impair seriously the official's performance of duty, the government should not enjoy immunity from liability
simply because the official is immune.
More important, as a policy matter, any rigid equation of governmental
with officer immunity assumes a happy congruence between the compensatory
purposes of tort law, on the one hand, and its deterrent and retributive
purposes, on the other, that simply does not exist. Situations frequently
arise in which it is appropriate to require the government to compensate for
harm done by a public official, even though it is inappropriate to hold the
official personally liable. For example, in the well-known case of Miller v.
Horton,76 a state health officer, acting under a statute requiring him to
destroy horses infected with glanders, ordered plaintiff's horse put to death
in the reasonable though mistaken belief that it had the disease. Imposing
liability on the government rather than the innocent officer in that case would
have provided the victims a remedy, while distributing the loss over the entire
community in whose interest the program was presumably initiated. This
would have been a fair and sensible result. Moreover, even if an official
has acted culpably, placing the full monetary burden on his shoulders may
be out of proportion to his fault. Consider the case of a municipal power
plant operator whose slight delay in responding to danger signals paves the
way for a blackout with untold financial consequences for the entire community.
A further justification for accepting a broader scope of governmental
than officer liability is that some losses occasioned by governmental activity
may not be traceable to any particular official. For example, legislation
may impose duties upon the government that the latter simply fails to
implement. Some state tort statutes now deal explicitly with this situation by
establishing governmental liability in damages for failure to exercise reasonable diligence to carry out the law.77 More generally, however, a governmental operation may suffer from inefficiency, delay or other systemic
disorders that cannot be laid at the feet of any particular official yet still
cause injury that warrants compensation.
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975). Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 146-50
(E.D. Va. 1977).
The view that governmental immunity should be narrower than officer immunity has
found support in the literature. See, e.g., K. DAvis, ADMINISRATIVE LAW TREATIsE
§ 25.17 (Supp. 1970). See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 5, at § 29.15.
76. 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891) (Holmes, J.). For a decision immunizing the
official, but not the public entity, in such a situation, see Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 375
P.2d 696 (Alas. 1962).
77. E.g., CAL. Gov'r. CODE § 815.6 (West 1966).
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The Allocation of Liability

Even assuming a perfect correlation between the tort liability of the
government and its officials, the problem remains of allocating the burden
between them in any given case. Indeed, this problem may arise as long as
there is any overlap in liability. In situations in which both the government
and the individual official are sued for torts committed by the official while
acting within the scope of his authority, courts may have to resort to common
law or statutory principles of responsibility among joint tortfeasors in
deciding whether and to what extent apportionment of damages or contribution is appropriate. 78 Application of such general rules in the peculiar
context of governmental torts may produce individual results that are undesirable for reasons discussed earlier. 79 Moreover, the official may have
acted in whole or in part beyond the scope of his authority, and to that
extent he should be exclusively liable. Matters become still more complex
when the government is directly rather than vicariously liable, as in cases
in which it breaches an independent duty to supervise its officers and
employees or where the deficiency complained of is basically systemic in
character.80
The fact that litigants frequently sue only the government, on the
assumption that its pocket is invariably broader and deeper, does not
dispose of these difficulties. If the litigant recovers, the common law
may entitle the government to indemnification from the official in whole
or in part.8 ' Conversely, if a litigant chooses to make the individual official
his sole defendant, and prevails on the merits, that official too may have a
common law right of recovery against the government.8 2 Until recently,
tort claims legislation ignored this aspect of the allocation problem. The
silence of the Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, left it for the courts to
decide that the Act confers neither upon the negligent federal official 83 nor
upon the United States 84 a right of indemnity against the other. Recent state
78. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, §§ 10.1, 10.2, 20.3; NV.PROSSER, supra
note 14, § 50, at 305-07, § 52; FEDERAL LrrImAIoN, supra note 43, at 210.
79. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text, supra.
80. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, supra note 5, § 10.1, at 699 n.49; text accompanying
note 77 supra.

81. The common law entitles one who is vicariously liable for the harn done by another
person to complete indemnity from the latter. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, supra note 5, at
723; note 141 infra.
82. This will most often be the case where the employee acts at the specific direction
of the employer and in justifiable reliance on the lawfulness of his action. See Sorge v.
City of New York, 56 Misc.2d 414, 419, 288 N.Y.S.2d 787, 794-95 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (employee
has right to complete indemnity if not in pari delicto with employer). 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 5, at 725. But see Fiebinger v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 1007, 1010-11, 51
N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Pursuit by a public official of a right of indemnification

from the government may be precluded by the sovereign immunity doctrine where it is still in
effect.
83. See Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818
(1963). However, a joint tortfeasor may sue the United States for contribution under the
Act. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
84. See United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). See notes 140-42 and accompanying text infra. Even under Gilman, however, the United States may implead an insurer
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legislation is more explicit. Some statutes require the government, within
stated limitations, to pay judgments rendered against its officials or to indemnify the latter for judgments they have already paid. 8 Others entitle an
official who is sued to a free legal defense by government attorneys 8 or to
reimbursement of his litigation costs.8 7 On the other hand, state legislation
frequently provides the government with a limited right of indemnity against
its officials both for judgments it has had to pay as a result of their misconduct 88 and for the litigation costs involved. 9
The ill-defined relationship between governmental and officer liability
at common law and, to a lesser extent, under tort claims legislation, calls
for remedial action. First, on a practical level, prospective plaintiffs
need a clearer idea than they can possibly have today of the monetary
responsibility of governments and their officials. The current proliferation
of defendants in damage actions against public authorities may not be due
entirely to nuisance value, but may owe something to litigants' honest uncertainty over what relief if any can be expected from whom. Second, confusion
over the relationship between governmental and officer liability has serious
implications for the courts, for it compels them to cope with the intricate
problems of coordination discussed in this section on a cumbersome case by
case basis. Third, such confusion leaves essentially unresolved that imponderable with which the law seems so concerned-the impact upon public officials
of the threat of personal liability.90 Admittedly, the difficulty of devising
a formula that will maximize the putative benefits of fear, while minimizing
its harm, can scarcely be exaggerated. But even in the absence of further
empirical research, common sense admonishes against choosing a system in
which the climate of fear is too unpredictable either to tame the reckless
or to allow the timid to act.
Clearly, the task of balancing the interests relevant to governmental
tort litigation is legislative in character. The following section explores some
statutory alternatives to the pattern of vaguely parallel governmental and
officer tort liability that prevails today.
as third party defendant in a pending tort action, provided the government is the insured
under a policy covering injury caused by the official involved. GovERNmENT LITIGATION, supra
note 43, at 490.
85. See notes 96-97 infra.
86. See note 45 supra.
87. See, e.g., CAL Gov'T CODE § 996.4 (West 1966) (except in cases of "actual fraud,
corruption or actual malice"); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-16a (West Supp. 1978) (except in
cases of "wanton, reckless, or malicious" acts); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-48-4 (Supp. 1977)
(except in cases of "gross negligence, fraud, or malice").
88. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825.6 (West Supp. 1977)

(in cases of "actual fraud,

corruption or actual malice"); IDAHO CODE § 6-903(d) (Supp. 1977) (in cases showing "malice

or criminal intent"); Na,. Rav. STAT. § 41.0337(9) (1977) (in cases of "wanton or malicious"
conduct); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-48-5(2) (Supp. 1977) (in cases of "gross negligence, fraud,

or malice").
89. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-903(d) (Supp. 1977) (in cases of "malice or criminal
intent"); ORE. GEN. STAT. §§ 30.285(5), .287(3) (1975) (in cases of "Wilful or wanton neglect

of duty").
90. See notes 22, 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
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ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR INTEGRATING GOVERNMENTAL
AND OFFICER TORT LIABILITY

The serious difficulty created by the dissociation between governmental
and officer tort law suggests the advantage of a model based primarily upon
the liability of either the individual official or the governmental entity.
A.

Officer Based Liability

1. Exclusive Officer Liability. Whatever its merits from the point of
view of individual deterrence, any approach to governmental tort law based

exclusively on officer liability raises serious objections. The most important
of these is the probable frustration of tort law's compensatory purposes.
Unless all public officials are made to carry a generous quantity of liability
insurance,91 or governments are made to carry it for them,9 2 their frequent
incapacity to satisfy large judgments would make any such system
unacceptable. 93 Furthermore, wherever the line between too much and too
little fear of liability may be drawn, holding public officials exclusively

liable for tort claims arising out of governmental activity is likely at times
to dissuade them from taking prompt and decisive action.
2. Officer Liability with Indemnification. During the period in which
the sovereign immunity doctrine effectively shielded the government from
tort liability, any effort to accommodate the various interests at stake
proceeded from the premise that the individual official, if anyone, would

be primarily liable for government-infficted injury. The heavy burden thus

imposed on the official might then be alleviated through full or partial
indemnification by the government. 94 Today, statutes frequently authorize99
91. See Van Alstyne, Public Policy, supra note 1, at 490-91. Another means of ensuring
that public officials are not judgment-proof is to require them to post a faithful performance
bond in favor of persons they injure. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 1480-81, 1550 (West 1966).
92. See note 44 supra.
93. See Jennings, supra note 3, at 293. See also Davis, supra note 3, at 212.
94. The practice of reimbursing public officials for their payment of service-related
judgments has a long history. As early as 1805, Congress enacted a private bill indemnifying
the captain of the frigate Constellation for damages awarded against him by a federal court
for the tortious seizure of a private schooner. Act of Jan. 31, 1805, Statute II, ch. 12, 6 Stat.
56 (1805). The decision was Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804). Some 30 years later, the Supreme Court suggested that federal officials had a
general right of indemnity against the government for liabilities arising out of their good faith
performance of duty. Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 79, 97-98 (1836). Accord, Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 263 (1845).
95. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-302 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Micu. CoMP. LAWs
ANN. § 691.1408 (1968); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 466.07(1), (2) (West 1977) (except in cases of
"malfeasance in office or wilful or wanton neglect of duty"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1758
(West Supp. 1977) (except in cases of "malfeasance in office, wilful or wanton neglect of
duty").
To counter any argument that indemnification amounts to paying the personal obligations
of public officials and therefore violates constitutional prohibitions against the personal use of
public funds, some recent state legislation expressly declares that payment by the government
of claims arising out of the tortious conduct of public officials shall be considered to have
been done for a valid public purpose. See, e.g., UTAH CooE ANN. § 63-30-27 (Supp. 1977);
WAsH. RaV. CooE ANN. § 4.92.170 (Supp. 1977).
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or even compel 6 the government to indemnify its officers. A few state
legislatures have taken the logical next step of requiring the government to

satisfy those judgments directlyYT Even in the absence of any such statute
some courts have recognized a limited common law right of idemnity. 5
Virtually every existing right of indemnity enjoyed by public officials

is subject to exclusions not only for action beyond the outer perimeters of
their authority, but also for egregious action within those preimeters.
Egregious action has been defined variously, 99 but each definition seeks to
ensure that the individual official ultimately bears personal liability in those
situations where the need for deterrence and retribution is greater.
The most curious aspect of indemnification may be the widespread
assumption among scholars that it is in fact practiced. Professor Jaffe, for
example, is probably correct in suggesting that plaintiffs often bring damage
actions against public officials as an indirect means of reaching public
funds; 100 but he further assumes that the government actually reimburses its
officials for judgments they have paid, arguing from this premise that the
prospect of personal tort liability serves no real deterrent purpose. 10 1 Yet,
the assumption that the government generally indemnifies its officials for
service-related judgments, or pays those judgments for them, may not
be warranted. The federal government, for example, does so only in the

narrow category of cases in which Congress has authorized the practice
expressly. 10 2 Though the Constitution is silent on the subject, the Justice
96. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825.2 (West Supp. 1977) (except for "actual fraud,
corruption or actual malice"); CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 4-16a (West Supp. 1978) (except in
cases of "wanton, reckless, or malicious" acts); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 25A.21, 613A.8 (West
Supp. 1977) (except for "willful or wanton" conduct); N.Y. GEN. MuM. LAw § 50b-4
(McKinney 1977); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (except for "willful
and wrongful act or gross negligence"); OR. Rav. STAT. § 30.285(1), (2) (1975) (except for
"malfeasance in office or wilful or wanton neglect of duty"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-48-4
(Supp. 1977) (except for "gross negligence, fraud, or malice").
97. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465
(West Supp. 1978) (except for "wilful or wanton" acts); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(9) (West
Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-48-3(4) (Supp. 1977) (except for "gross negligence,
fraud, or malice").
98. See note 82 supra. The problem has also arisen in connection with actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which is silent on the indemnification question. A minority of
courts have accorded officials successfully sued under the statute a right of recovery against
the government, at least when they acted in good faith and within the scope of their authority.
See, e.g., Courtney v. School Dist. No. 1, 371 F. Supp. 401 (D. Wyo. 1974); Hill v. Toll, 320
F. Supp. 185, 188-89 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Contra, Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F. Supp. 407, 410-11
(D.S.C. 1976). See generally Note, Vicarious Liability under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REv. 509
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Vicarious Liability).
99. See notes 149 and 156 infra.
100. Jaffe, supra note 3, at 216-17. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmiMisTRATrvE ACTioN 238-39 (abr. ed. 1965).
101. Jaffe, supra note 3, at 217. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 790, 447 P.2d 352,
358-59, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246-47 (1968); Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in
Operation, 54 HAv. L. Rav. 437, 451-53 (1941).
102. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089(f) (West Supp. 1977); 22 U.S.C.A. § 817(f) (West
Supp. 1977); 38 U.S.C.A. §4116(e) (West Supp. 1977); 42 U.S.C. §233(f) (1970); 42
U.S.C.A. § 2458(f) (West Supp. 1977) (liability for personal injury or death attributable to
action of certain medical personnel of armed forces, Defense Department, Central Intelligence
Agency, State Department, Veterans' Administration, Public Health Service and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, where no direct remedy available against United
States); 26 U.S.C. § 7423 (1970) (liability for wrongful collection of internal revenue).
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Department has taken the view that paying the judgments of federal officials
in any other case would be an unauthorized expenditure of public funds. 103
Until now, the most the federal government has been willing to do is to pay
in full those judgments rendered jointly against it and one of its officials
and to release the official from any further liability.10 4
To some extent, confusion may stem from the failure to distinguish
between payment of judgments, on the one hand, and provision of a free
legal defense, on the other.

Rare circumstances aside, 105 the Justice

Department normally will offer a federal official the free services of its own
attorneys, provided he was acting within the scope of his authority at the
time the injury occurred. 0 6
Cases arise, however, in which the Justice Department declines to defend
a federal official even in a service-related action. One example is where a
federal criminal indictment or information has been issued against an
official with respect to the same acts which underlie the tort action. 0 7
Though the Department's chief concern in such a situation is avoiding a
a conflict of interest between its civil and criminal divisions,10 8 it also justifies
its refusal to defend on the ground that doing so would serve no valid
governmental interest.10 9 Even if the Department determines that an official
103. See Hearings on Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 1977 Before Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 861 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Supplemental
Appropriations Hearings]. The Attorney General's recent appeal to Congress for authority to
satisfy service-related judgments against law enforcement and intelligence officers reflects this
understanding. Address by Attorney General Bell, American Bar Association, Judicial Administration Division, Annual Meeting (Aug. 8, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Bell Address]. Cf.
Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 920 (1977) (reason
for giving military doctors absolute immunity from suit for medical malpractice is their modest
income and fact that they are not entitled to indemnification by the government).
104. See Dep't of Justice Memorandum No. 799, Pub. L. No. 93-253, amending
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) of the Federal Tort Claims Act (July 10, 1974). Similarly, the
standard practice of the United States in settling tort claims against it is to require dismissal

with prejudice of any related action by the claimant against the officials involved and release
of any rights against them. See FEDERAL LrrioArnoN, supra note 43, at 233.
105. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7423 (1970) (liability for wrongful collection of internal
revenue taxes). See also 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089(b) (West Supp. 1977); 22 U.S.C.A. § 817(b)
(West Supp. 1977); 28 U.S.C. §2679(c) (1970); 38 U.S.C.A. §4116(b) (West Supp. 1977);
42 U.S.C. § 233(b) (1970); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2458(b) (West Supp. 1977).
106. See Dep't of Justice Order No. 683-77, Statement of Policy-Limitation for Representation of Federal Employees, 42 Fed. Reg. 5695, 5696 (1977) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.15) [hereinafter cited as Justice Department Representation Policy], which also makes the
decision to represent a federal official depend on whether doing so is "in the interest of the
United States." See also House Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 31, at 546,
556, 568 (statement of Irving Jaffe). The legal basis cited for the practice is a federal statute
reserving to the Department authority over "the conduct of litigation in which the United
States, an agency, or official thereof is a party, or is interested. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970).
See also id. §§ 516, 518; House Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 31, at 546.
The Department has invoked, as the basis of its authority to engage private counsel, both
the Attorney General's general contracting power, 41 U.S.C.A. § II(a) (West Supp. 1977), and
his inherent executive authority, see United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 13-14
(1833). Memorandum from John M. Harmon to Irving Jaffe (Feb. 16, 1977), reprinted In
Senate Supplemental AppropriationsHearings,supra note 103, at 848.49.
107. See Justice Department Representation Policy, supra note 106, at 5696.
108. See House Supplemental AppropriationsHearings, supra note 31, at 546.
109. See Bell Address, supra note 103. The "valid governmental interest" consideration
also precludes the Department from paying for the official's representation by private counsel.
See Justice Department Representation Policy, supra note 106. On the other hand, the
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is merely "the target of a criminal investigation," it still will not represent
him, but it may in its discretion pay for the services of private counsel, thus
assuring him a free, conflict-proof defense. 110 Further potential for conflict
arises when a plaintiff in a civil suit growing out of governmental action
sues two or more federal officials who have inconsistent defenses."' Because
of the casual joinder of multiple defendants in governmental tort litigation
today, this situation occurs with great regularity. The Department's usual
response is to engage private counsel for each defendant."12
Underwriting the costs of a legal defense in these two kinds of situations
has proved an expensive proposition. The Attorney General recently reported
that, although the bar is generally willing to defend federal officials at reduced
fees, the Justice Department spent more than a million dollars over the last

two fiscal years for outside legal services.' 13 When asked in 1977 to
appropriate supplemental funds to meet this expense, Congress took a dim
view of the expenditures 1 4 and eventually cut the request by nearly two-

thirds."'5 More importantly, Congress indicated that some other solution to
the problem would have to be found." 6
On the state level, matters are less clear. Fifteen years ago, when the

California Law Revision Commission investigated the sovereign immunity
Department feels free to defend federal officials, and not simply to provide them with outside
counsel, when possible violations of state criminal law are involved. See House Supplemental
AppropriationsHearings, supra note 31, at 556.
110. See Justice Department Representation Policy, supra note 106; House Supplemental
AppropriationsHearings,supra note 31, at 556, 559, 570. This presupposes, of course, a finding
that the official acted within the scope of his employment and that providing him with outside
counsel is in the interest of the United States. The Department will not consider it in the
national interest even to provide outside counsel, when it is convinced that the official acted in
bad faith or actually violated federal or state criminal law. See id. at 570.
111. See House Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 31, at 546; Senate
Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 103, at 880; Bell Address, supra note 109;
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsBmIrrY, Canon 5, Ethical Considerations 5-14,
5-16 (1977). On the difficulty of grouping individual defendants in governmental tort cases
according to their interests, see House Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 31,
at 560, 562.
112. See Justice Department Representation Policy, supra note 106.
113. See House Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 31, at 559. Although
the Department has traditionally retained private counsel to defend federal officials, until
recently it has been able to absorb the cost through its normal operating budget. See id. at
561, 565; Senate Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 103, at 857, 859, 881.
Outside counsel is paid between $50 and $75 an hour, while government lawyers earn
about $10 an hour. See Marro, supra note 31.
114. See House Supplemental AppropriationsHearings, supra note 31, at 560, 563-64, 571;
Senate Supplemental AppropriationsHearings, supra note 103, at 856, 860-62. At the same time
that it sought supplemental funds for private counsel fees, the Justice Department requested an
additional $1,228,000 in connection with liability arising out of the national swine flu immunization program, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976), 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(j) (k)
(West Supp. 1977). Id. at 833.
115. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Stat. 61 (1977).
See Bell Address, supra note 103. The Justice Department had sought $4,878,000. See House
Supplemental AppropriationsHearings,supra note 31, at 546.
116. See House Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 31, at 564-66, 571;
Senate Supplemental Appropriations Hearings, supra note 103, at 878, 881. See also Justice
Dep't Assailed on Using Private Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1978, at 19, col. 2. The Justice
Department's recognition that retaining private counsel for all federal employees whom it
cannot represent offers no long term solution encouraged it to introduce the proposed
amendments to the Tort Claims Act. See notes 129-32 and accompanying text infra.
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problem in preparation for what was to become the state's governmental tort
claims legislation, nlT it found the practice of indemnification to be "haphazard and incomplete." 118 The little research that has been done elsewhere
tends to support this conclusion.'1 9 As noted earlier,1 20 however, a growing
number of states have since authorized or required public entities, within
limits, to indemnify public officials for judgments and legal costs incurred in
connection with their work.
One disadvantage of the indemnification approach, even when expressly
provided for by statute, is that it requires individual officials who are sued to
take the initiative in obtaining their indemnity from the government. Dislike
of litigation, fear of reprisals, or sheer inertia can easily deter officials from
doing so. Ironically, those whose timidity indemnification is designed to
overcome might be the ones most reluctant of all to demand it.
The indemnification approach has a second major drawback. Because
tort victims still would have an action only against the individual official,
their interest in compensation would remain subordinate to the latter's ability
to pay.' 21 Inherent in such a situation is the risk that plaintiffs may not
obtain full relief. Even if the system were modified to make the government
secondarily liable to tort victims for any unpaid balance on judgments against
a public official, that protection might be unavailable in cases falling within
the excluded category of egregious misconduct. 122 Yet, leaving the tort
victim without compensation when he is most mistreated seems not only
arbitrary, but perverse. At least where the official is acting broadly within
the scope of his authority when he commits the tort in question, the government should guarantee relief.
B.

Government Based Liability

1. Exclusive Governmental Liability. The case for a system of exclusive governmental liability is an attractive one. First, like the master-servant
rule in private law, exclusive governmental liability recognizes the greater
capacity of employers than of employees to provide compensation. 23 Besides having a deeper pocket, the government through taxation can more
easily distribute such losses among all who benefit from its services. Second,
117. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West Supp. 1977).
118. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION CoMM'N, supra note 29, at 814.
119. See Mathes & Jones, supra note 30, at 911-12.
120. See notes 95 & 97 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra.
122. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (no governmental liability
for "wilful misconduct"); IoA CODE ANN. § 25A.2(5) (West Supp. 1977) (no governmental
liability for "willful and wanton conduct"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-10 (West Supp. 1977) (no
governmental liability for "actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct"). See also Mills v.
County of Winnebago, 104 Ill. App. 2d 366, 244 N.E.2d 65 (1969); Givens v. Sellars, 273 N.C.
44, 159 S.E.2d 530 (1968). It has recently been suggested that the government's liability,
however limited, should at least cover injury due to intentional wrongdoing by its officers. See
Note, An Insurance Program to Effectuate Waiver of Sovereign Tort Immunity, 26 U. FLA.
L. REv. 89, 94-96 (1973), and cases cited therein.
123. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 459; Vicarious Liability, supra note 98, at 515.
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exclusive governmental liability may have advantages from a deterrence point
of view. By encouraging higher standards of care in the selection, training,
equipment, and supervision of personnel, such a system can have at least as
positive an effect on governmental performance as one based upon liability
of the individual official.'"
It would also protect the official from any
paralyzing threat of direct personal liability, thus presumably improving
morale and effectiveness.
Finally, the principle of exclusive governmental liability offers distinct
advantages from the point of view of litigation. In its absence, plaintiffs tend
to sue multiple defendants as a means of enhancing the likelihood of ultimate
recovery. An immediate consequence of joining individual officials and the
government as defendants is that the officials may need independent legal
representation in order to enjoy a conflict-free defense. The cost of those
services may pose a major financial hardship. Even if the government pays
the bill, as is often the case,125 the cost will consume precious tax dollars. 126
Furthermore, adding defendants increases the complexity of litigation in
nearly every procedural respect. Compounding parties usually means compounding substantive issues as well. Although removing the individual official
as defendant normally will not remove him as witness, it may lessen and even
obviate the need to resolve issues such as good faith or reasonableness upon
which personal immunity may depend. Sole governmental liability, in short,
promises aggrieved persons adequate compensation for their losses while
eliminating the temptation to inject unnecessary defendants and issues into
the litigation.
Systems of exclusive governmental liability are not unknown. One
example is the federal statute which creates an exclusive cause of action
against the United States for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a
federal employee within the scope of his employment. 127 Moreover, as a
practical matter, exclusive governmental liability obtains whenever a statute
obligates public entities to defend their officers and employees in civil damage
2 8
actions and to pay any resulting judgments.
Significantly, the Justice Department recently proposed to Congress a
124. See Davis, supra note 3, at 217; Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police,
52 Tax. L. REv. 703, 720 n.47 (1974); Fuller & Casner, supra note 101, at 460; James,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YAI.E L.J. 549, 569
(1948). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 422 n.5 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
125. See notes 113-16 and accompanying text supra.
126. See David, supra note 1, at 4, 6; Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity
of State and Local Government, 1959 DuKE L.J. 588.
127. 28 U.S.C. 82679(b) (1970). Other examples of exclusive governmental liability
include 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089(a) (West Supp. 1977); 22 U.S.C.A. § 817(a) (West Supp. 1977);
38 U.S.C.A. § 4116(a) (West Supp. 1977); 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C.A. §2458a(a)
(West Supp. 1977) (liability for personal injury or death attributable to action of certain
medical personnel of armed forces, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, State
Department, Veterans' Administration, Public Health Service, and National Aeronautics and
Space Administration); 26 U.S.C. § 7426(d), (e) (1970) (liability for wrongful levy, for
surplus proceeds or substituted sale proceeds); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498(b) (West Supp. 1977)
(liability for copyright infringement); 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1970) (suits in admiralty).
128. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815.2, 996.4 (West 1966). See notes 45-46, 95-97 supra.
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bill that would amend the Federal Tort Claims Act to make the United
States the sole defendant in civil damage suits arising out of federal governmental activity.' 29 The bill extends the principle of exclusive liability not only

to common law torts committed by federal officials within the scope of their
duty, but also to constitutional wrongs, whether committed "within the scope
of" or "under color of" office.' 30 Even under the proposed legislation, however, the Act would contain numerous and important exceptions.' 8 ' In order
not to foreclose plaintiffs from recovering damages from individual officials
in cases not covered by the statute, the bill limits the principle of exclusivity
to situations in which the Federal Tort Claims Act permits recovery against
the United States. 32
The major objection to exclusive governmental liability is that it dis129. S. 2117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9219, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Justice Department Bill]. The Justice Department submitted the bill in an
effort, not only to provide tort victims with a financially responsible defendant and lessen
federal officials' fear of personal liability, but also to eliminate the Department's need to engage
private counsel on behalf of officials who have been sued. See Letter from Attorney General
Griffin B. Bell to Vice President Mondale (Sept. 16, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Bell Letter];
Bell Address, supra note 103; notes 109-116 and accompanying text supra.
For a description of an earlier effort by the Justice Department to make the federal
government exclusively liable for service-related torts, see Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The
Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An InterpretativeAnalysis, 54 U. N.C.
L. R v. 497, 512, 514 (1976).
The exposure of state officials to personal liability under federal civil rights legislation, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), makes it difficult for state legislatures to accomplish as sweeping a

reform as Congress is now considering. Since the courts have held that states, see, eg,p
Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974), municipalities,
see e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), other state political subdivisions, see, e.g.,
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 706 (1973), and governmental instrumentalities,
see, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Seres., 532 F.2d 259, 262-64 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 807 (1977) (No. 75-1914); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236,
1249 (6th Cir. 1974), are immune from liability under § 1983, substitution of governmental for
officer liability in such cases would require statutory amendment. The Supreme Court only
recently suggested that the eleventh amendment would not bar Congress from imposing § 1983
liability directly upon the states and their component agencies. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 451-56 (1976). However, state legislatures may, consistent with the federal policy behind
the Civil Rights Act, provide under certain circumstances for indemnification by the state of
public officials held liable under § 1983. See note 98 supra.
130. Justice Department Bill, supra note 129, § 5. The "under color of" test is described
as broader than the "within the scope of" test. Bell Letter, supra note 129. The bill provides
that, upon certification of scope of employment or color of office by the Attorney General, a
lawsuit filed against an individual federal official in state court will be removed to federal
district court and the United States substituted as defendant. The suit would then proceed as
if it had been initiated against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Justice
Department Bill, supra note 129, § 6; Bell Letter, supra note 129.
By recognizing a broad statutory cause of action against the United States for the
constitutional torts of its officials, the bill greatly expands the bases of federal liability. Sections
1 and 2 of the bill provide that causes of action based on constitutional tort theory would be
governed by federal law. Nevertheless, state law would continue to apply to common law tort
actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). Damages
would be governed by state law regardless of the theory upon which the court grants them.
See Bell Letter, supra note 129. However, § 3 of the bill would guarantee the victim of a
constitutional tort at least $1,000 in liquidated damages, as well as reasonable costs, including
attorney's fees.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970). In particular, actions for libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, and interference with contract rights would continue to be excluded from the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Id. § 2680(h). Justice Department Bill, supra note 129, § 8. The discretionary
acts exception presumably also remains unaffected.
132. Justice Department Bill, supra note 129, § 3. See Bell Letter, supra note 129. Beyond
those cases, common law principles of officer liability presumably would remain unimpaired.
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regards the element of personal fault. Because there are good reasons for
preserving the personal liability of public officials, at least where they have
acted egregiously-for example in the case of intentional wrongdoing or gross
negligence-this objection is important. First, the harm resulting from such
conduct is probably more easily avoided than the harm caused by simple
negligence and is therefore a poorer candidate for consideration as an ordinary
cost of government. Second, if the threat of personal liability serves some
deterrent purpose, its imposition would seem particularly useful where willful
or wanton misconduct is concerned. Finally, even if such conduct cannot
readily be eliminated, it does not follow that the public should have to pay
for its consequences. On the contrary, retributive justice would seem to
demand that public officials answer personally for egregious conduct. 183 Such
considerations suggest the importance of not absolving public officials of
responsibility for their irresponsible behavior. The Justice Department bill
meets this need through a system of administrative discipline. It specifically
requires the Attorney General to refer the matter to the head of the department or agency involved "for such further administrative investigation or
disciplinary action as may be appropriate"' 3 4 whenever an official's misconduct results in the payment of damages by the federal government.
A system of administrative discipline has obvious strengths. First, its
broad assortment of penalties--censure, fine or suspension, to name a fewprovides a flexibility often missing in awards of civil damages.' 3 5 Thus, the
sanction to be imposed on the offending official would be dictated not by the
victim's entitlement to compensation, but by a variety of more directly relevant factors such as the official's past record of service, the risks inherent in
his job, and the paralyzing effect, if any, of personal liability upon his and
others' future performance. Of course, attention should also be given to the
deterrent value of the sanction chosen. In addition, it might be desirable to
require an official to reimburse the government for compensation and other
costs incurred as a result of his egregious misconduct, or to deprive him of
133. It has been questioned whether taxpayers should be asked to underwrite the cost of
insurance to protect against liability arising out of intentional wrongdoing. Insurance policies
frequently exclude protection against this kind of conduct. See McManis, supra note 3, at
850-51.
134. Justice Department Bill, supra note 129, § 7. Although the bill does not expressly so
provide, the Supreme Court's construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act in United States v.
Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954), would rule out any governmental right of recovery against the
individual official. See also note 158 infra. Judge Wilkey has suggested, as an alternative to
civil liability, "oversight-by the press, by Congress, by the public, and by internal agency
personnel." Expeditions Unltd. Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289,
305 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ea banc) (concurring opinion). In many cases, criminal sanctions
would also be available.
135. See R VAuGHN, THE SPomED SysEri 154, 162 (1975); Vaughn, supra note 3, at
116-19. Federal law authorizes disciplinary action against federal employees "for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1976); 5 C.F.R. § 752.104(a)
(1977). Such cause includes "(1) [d]elinquency or misconduct in prior employment; (2)

[c]riminal, dishonest, infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct, .. . [and] (8) any statutory

disqualification which makes the individual unfit for the service." Id. §§ 731.202, 752.104(a)
(1977). Sanctions available at the federal level include removal, suspension, leave without pay,
and reduction in rank or pay. 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1970); 5 C.F.R. § 752.101 (1977).
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any sum by which he may have been unjustly enriched. Given the fact that
official misconduct can take any number of forms, from motor vehicle violations to defamation, flexibility in the disciplinary process is highly useful.
Second, a system of administrative discipline in and of itself would be
an effective deterrent. Recent scholarship suggests that public officials respond at least as favorably to the threat of direct and immediate servicerelated sanctions as they do to the threat of civil litigation and eventual
liability in damages. 136 In any case, the fact that the offending official may
not be a party to the litigation or run the risk of personal liability does not
necessarily mean that the litigation and liability would serve no deterrent
purpose. Indeed, focusing civil liability on the government may actually
13
have an advantage in this respect.
Third, isolating for separate treatment the issues related to deterrence
and retribution would simplify the conduct of tort litigation, thus permitting
courts to concentrate on the victim's entitlement to compensation. At the
same time, disciplinary responsibility would be left in the hands of the
relevant department or agency head, who is presumably more familiar than
a judge with the difficulties that a particular official faces in his work. Finally,

a system of administrative discipline, unlike private litigation, would not make
the imposition of sanctions for misconduct depend upon whether the victim
chooses to institute legal action.
The effectiveness of this approach depends, of course, upon the unarticulated premise in the Justice Department's bill that a system of disciplinary sanctions would be taken seriously. While evidence suggests that
until now such systems have not functioned adequately, 8 s efforts toward
reform appear to be underway. 3 9 Since the Justice Department proposal
would assign to the disciplinary mechanism virtually the entire deterrent and
retributive function, the importance of its reliability can scarcely be exaggerated. In the final analysis, no system based upon exclusive governmental
liability should be adopted simply because it offers an expedient way of
compensating the victims of government-inflicted harm. Society has at least
as much interest in preventing misconduct as in compensating those injured
136. See Davis, supra note 3, at 216-17; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations o]
Individual Rights, 39 MnuN. L. REV. 493, 514-15 (1955); James, supra note 124, at 559-63;
James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HA{v. L. Rav. 769, 779-82

(1950).
137. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
138. See Foote, supra note 136, at 494-95; Vaughn, supra note 3, at 107. See also Buder,
Thirty New York Policemen Fail Corruption-Complaint Tests, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1977, at 1,
col. 3.
139. President Carter has recently called for legislative action to reward merit and penalize
incompetence on the part of federal executive officials. In addition to recommending that the
Civil Service Commission's responsibilities for enforcing standards of service and for protecting
employee rights be assigned to new separate agencies-an Office of Personnel Management and
a Merit Systems Protection Board, respectively-he has urged an end to automatic status and
pay increases for managers and supervisors, and speedier dismissal of incompetent employees.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 1. Bills to this effect have been introduced in both houses
of Congress. S. 2640, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 11280, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
Professor Vaughn advocates, among other things, a mechanism by which aggrieved citizens
may invoke disciplinary procedures against delinquent officials. M VAUGHN, supra note 135, at
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by such misconduct. Society also has a right to insist that when public
officials conduct themselves egregiously, they do so at their own risk.
2.

Governmental Liability with Indemnification. A system of govern-

mental liability with indemnification would preserve the compensatory advantages of exclusive governmental liability. To achieve the desired deterrent
and retributive effects in cases of egregious misconduct, however, it would
rely not upon administrative discipline but upon a judicially enforced right of
recovery. In light of the Supreme Court's refusal to infer a governmental
right of recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act,140 legislatures seeking
to establish such a right may have to do so expressly. On the other hand,
since subrogating the government to service-related claims against its officials
is fully consistent with common law principles, 14' any intent to exclude or
42
limit a right of recovery likewise should be made explicit.1
It is important to note that statutes establishing a system of governmental liability with indemnification rarely 43 make the plaintiff's cause of
action against the government exclusive.' 44 Because they permit the joinder
of the individual official as defendant, such statutes leave the door open to
complicated litigation that is vexatious to public officials. An express exclusivity provision would eliminate this problem.
Assuming the plaintiff is permitted to sue only the government, the key
issue remains whether the governmental right of recovery only introduces
similar problems of complicated, vexatious litigation at a later stage. It
probably does not. In the first place, if the government prevails in the main
action, it will have no right of recovery. Assuming that the government loses,
it would seek indemnification only if it were convinced that the official acted
154-66. See also Center for Governmental Responsibility, Civil Sanctions: A Proposal for
Promoting the Personal Accountability of Public Employees 1-7, 25, 29, 36-37 (Feb. 1977)
(unpublished report).
140. In United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954), the Court found no satisfactory
guidance in either the text or the legislative history of the statute. After weighing the relative
merits of allowing or denying the government a right of recovery, it decided to leave the
matter "for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them." Id. at 513.
In fact, the legislative history contains support for the view that Congress meant to deny any
such right. See Bills to Provide for the Adjustment of Certain Tort Claims Against the United
States, Hearingson H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9-10 (1942) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea); S. Rep. No.
1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942). Viewed in this light, the Court's decision may have been
an invitation for Congress to reevaluate the question of subrogation of the government to
private claims against its officials. But see Vaughn, supra note 3, at 105-06.
141. The common law permits an employer to recover from an employee amounts paid to
compensate persons whom the employee injures while acting within the scope of his employment. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 311-13; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 343,
401 (1958). See also Tyree v. City of Los Angeles, 92 Cal. App. 2d 182, 206 P.2d 912 (1949).
Warren Seavey, reporter for the Restatement, suggested that "indemnity should be granted
under the ordinary rules of restitution because the employee caused a loss which in equity and
good conscience should be paid by him." Seavey, "Liberal Construction" and the Tort Liability
of the Federal Government, 67 HARv. L. REv. 995, 1002 (1954).
142. See, e.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 825.4, 996 (West 1966).
143. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3322 (1976) (no remedy against employee for
damages for which governmental entity is liable under Governmental Tort Liability Act unless
damages sought exceed certain limits).
144. See notes 88-89 supra.
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egregiously. Even then, the government might conclude that the detrimental
effect of the threat of personal liability on the official and his colleagues
outweighs the need for indemnification and deterrence. Thus, allowing the
government to determine initially issues such as an official's good faith or an
official's need for freedom from fear of liability might, as in the exclusive
liability model, release the courts from having to consider such questions in
the vast majority of cases. In any event, giving the government rather than
the injured party the discretion to sue the official would make the official's
exposure to litigation and liability less arbitrary than it is today.1 45
Cases will arise, however, in which the government seeks to enforce a
claim to which it is subrogated, and some mechanism for handling such cases
must therefore be devised. This raises delicate procedural problems. The
interest in removing issues peculiar to an official's immunity defense from the
main action militates in favor of barring the government from suit until that
action has terminated. However, since the official would then appear in the
first proceeding as at most a witness, he would not be bound by the court's
findings. This would invite a subsequent relitigation of issues, thus imposing
an added burden on judicial and personal resources.
On the other hand, permitting the government routinely to file thirdparty complaints against individual officials upon the commencement of the
main action would thwart the very purpose of confining the plaintiff to a suit
against the government. It would complicate, often needlessly, the conduct
of the main action. More importantly, by hastening the direct involvement
of individual officials in tort actions brought against the government, it might
intensify their fear of personal litigation and liability. On balance, it seems
desirable to require the government if possible to assert its right of recovery
against its officials in the course of the main action, but not necessarily at
the outset. In fact, the government might be barred from asserting it at all,
unless and until the evidence suggests a prima facie case of egregious misconduct.
There is probably little reason to fear the precipitous or indiscriminate
filing of third-party complaints. A more serious concern is whether the
government would exercise its rights of recovery at all. Studies on the
exercise of similar rights in the private sector suggest that some skepticism
on this score may be warranted; apparently private employers rarely pursue
subrogated claims against their employees. 146 The little information that
145. See Expeditions Unltd. Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289,
307 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Wilkey, 3., concurring). Cf. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review
of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MxcH. L. REv. 387, 465 (1970) (in the
context of suits challenging validity of administrative action, government should have
responsibility for adding individuals or agencies as defendants).
146. See James, supra note 124, at 556-57; James, supra note 3, at 638; Leflar & Kantro.
witz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1363, 1414 (1954); Note, Government
Recovery of Indemnity from Negligent Employees: A New Federal Policy, 63 YALE L.J. 570
n.3 (1954). This may simply reflect the capacity of employers to absorb and pass on to the
consumer the losses caused by employees, just as they pass on other costs of doing business.
It may further reflect concern over the adverse effects of personal liability on employee morale

and labor relations.
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exists indicates that the government is also slow to invoke existing rights of
indemnification.

47

Still, these data should not be regarded as decisive. The

mere fact that an available means of preventing and punishing official misconduct is underutilized is a poor reason for discarding or rejecting it.
Indeed, the situation calls for developing means by which the government
may be encouraged, and under certain circumstances compelled, to exercise
its limited rights of recovery. Without such means, the deterrent and retribu148
tive purpose of the system would be undermined.

A further problem raised by the partial indemnification model is defining
the category of egregious conduct to which the government's right of recovery
should extend. It is generally assumed that a standard such as "fraud,
corruption or . . .malice" 149 should apply. Such a standard has certain
advantages. It accords with the widely held belief that deliberately wrongful
behavior merits harsh treatment on both retributive and deterrent grounds. 50
Moreover, requiring the government to show fraud, corruption or malice in
order to recover limits the exposure of public officials to litigation and
liability. Officials who actually exercise good faith in the performance of
their duties should have relatively little to fear.' 5'
While it may not be difficult to rally support for the principle that
public officials should pay personally for their fraud, corruption or malice, 52
the fact remains that conduct which is neither fraudulent, corrupt nor
malicious still may be highly improper and injurious. 153 Yet, as both federal
constitutional tort 54 and civil rights' 55 cases suggest, conditioning the govern147. See David, supra note 1, at 36; Davis, supra note 3, at 208-09. Prior to United
States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954), see note 140 and accompanying text supra, the federal
government sought and recovered damages against its employees in a number of cases. See,
e.g., Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
148. A principal argument of those who have advocated abrogation of the sovereign
immunity doctrine is that giving the government a right of indemnity against its employees
would preserve their incentive to act with due care. See Fuller & Casner, supra note 140, at
450, 459.
149. Many states have adopted such a formula. See, e.g., IDAxo CODE § 6-903(d) (1977)
("malice or criminal intent"). See also notes 87-89, 122 supra.
The formula's emphasis on bad faith may reflect the fact that many formative cases on
officer liability arose in the area of defamation in which considerations of motive have traditionally been important See, e.g., Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959); Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718
(1941). See also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). See generally Handler & Klein, The
Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Oeflcials, 74 HARv.
L. Rnv. 44, 65-68 (1960); Jennings, supra note 3, at 308-09.
150. See James, supra note 3, at 647.
151. See Jaffe, supra note 3, at 231.
152. See 2 F. HARR & F. JAmEs, supra note 5, at 1645; Gray, supra note 3, at 310, 333.
153. See, e.g., Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 150 (E.D. Va. 1977).
154. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1341, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972) (federal agents violating fourth amendment immunized
from personal liability only for action taken "in good faith and with a reasonable belief in
[its] validity").
155. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975) (student suing school board
members in § 1983 action) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974): "It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct."). Toward the end of
the Wood opinion, the majority seemed to merge the objective and subjective tests, requiring

1202

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1175

ment's right of recovery against its officials upon a showing of bad faith
would make it impossible to impose personal liability in such situations.
Recognition of this fact may account for the current tendency of state
legislatures to define egregious misconduct in objective as well as subjective
156
terms.
C.

Alternative Models Compared

An acceptable system of liability for government-inflicted harm should
adequately serve tort law's compensatory, deterrent, and retributive purposes
without unduly inhibiting official initiative. As we have seen, officer based
liability may fail to fully compensate the victim. Moreover, under those
models an official's accentuated exposure to litigation and liability may be
unjust and counterproductive. Government based liability, on the other
hand, provides a more promising alternative.
The fundamental advantage of government based liability is that it
permits separation of the various interests served by tort liability in the
governmental context. Making the government initially liable in damage
actions brought by governmental tort victims would tend to simplify litigation and enable courts to focus on the victim's entitlement to compensation,
without continuous concern over the exposure of public officials to undue
anxiety. Questions of deterrence and retribution, at present crudely resolved
through direct officer liability, would be left in the first instance to the
government. Redress against the offending official, should the government
deem it appropriate, might be provided through a disciplinary mechanism
or a limited right of recovery in the courts. However, to constitute an effective deterrent against serious misconduct, the prospect of personal accountability must be real. For this reason, whichever system is adopted, safeguards should be provided to enhance the likelihood of its actual use. For
example, the decision to invoke the disciplinary process or the government's right of recovery might be made mandatory in certain cases, or at
least vested in a governmental unit other than that served by the offending
57
officer.'
As compared to the right of recovery in the courts, administrative
discipline has several important advantages. Besides offering flexibility of
sanctions, it would lessen the involvement of the courts in internal disciplinplaintiffs to establish that the defendants acted with "such an impermissible motivation or with
such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that [their] action cannot
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." 420 U.S. at 322. Accord, Procunier v.
Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978).
156. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-48-5(2) (1977) ("gross negligence, fraud, or malice").
See also notes 45, 87-89, 95-97 supra.
157. Under the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§552(a) (4) (F) (1976), the Civil Service Commission is required to initiate proceedings to
determine whether disciplinary action is warranted in every case in which a court ordering
production of agency records finds that "the circumstances surrounding the withholding [of
those records] raise questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously." The

agency concerned must take the corrective action that the Commission recommends. See also
note 139 supra.
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ary matters, though of course leaving open the possibility of limited judicial
review over the imposition of sanctions. As a practical matter, too, the
government may be less reluctant to seek redress against public officials if
it does not have to go into court, at least in the first instance, to do so.

In view of the apparent advantages of the disciplinary mechanism as
a means of redress, it may be tempting for simplicity's sake to make it
the government's sole recourse against the offending official. The proposed
amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act adopt this course. 158 However,
the situation may arise in which the government is persuaded at an early
stage that the official acted egregiously and that imposing a measure of
personal liability would be appropriate. Foreclosing the government in
such a case from bringing the official into the pending tort litigation as a
third party defendant would bar the orderly and complete resolution of the
controversy and only invite the relitigation of common issues within the
disciplinary process, and perhaps in court, at a later date.
In the short run at least, it would seem preferable not only to leave
the appropriate governmental authority discretion in deciding whether
to proceed against the individual official, but also to leave it the option of
proceeding by way of disciplinary action or right of recovery. Actual
experience, coupled with research, should provide valuable insight into
the relative practical advantages of these alternatives and, more importantly,
into ways in which they can be made more effective.
IV.

THE INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AND OFFICER TORT
LIABILITY IN FRENCH AND GERMAN LAW

Recent developments in governmental tort law in France and Germany
lend support for reform of the kind this Article has suggested. At the
same time, however, they point to the need for close attention to the
form of recourse against the individual official. Because the problem of
158. The Justice Department gave four reasons for not providing for third party actions:
first, public officials normally can satisfy only modest money judgments; second, egregious
misconduct rarely occurs; third, the threat of personal involvement in tort litigation would
impair employee morale; and finally, the third party action would complicate litigation and
necessitate retention of private counsel at government expense. Bell Letter, supra note 129.
None of these reasons is persuasive. First, though a public official may be unable to satisfy
the full amount of the government's tort liability, he may be able to satisfy that portion for
which the government decides to seek recovery. Significantly, under government-based liability,
an official's inability to satisfy the judgment rendered against him in a third party action would
not jeopardize full compensation of the tort victim, since the government remains primarily
liable. Second, the fact that the Justice Department anticipates little occasion for the government to exercise a right of recovery is a poor reason for denying such a right in cases where
its use would be appropriate. Moreover, the probable infrequency of its use only weakens the
Department's remaining arguments. The availability of a weapon so seldom-and hopefully
discreetly-used is unlikely to undermine officer morale very seriously. Similarly, if the
government rarely makes its officials third party defendants, the complication of litigation and
cost of outside counsel should be relatively modest. In any case, if the government finds
underwriting the cost of private counsel too onerous, it might reconsider the practice, especially
in view of the fact that under the governmental liability with indemnification model no public
official would be brought into the tort litigation until the government satisfies itself that he
acted egregiously.
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integrating the government's tort liability with that of its officials raises
policy concerns which are more or less universal in character, the French
and German experience in this regard is worth considering.
A.

French Law

Even after the Revolution, the notion that the sovereign could do no
wrong continued to immunize the French state from tort liability. 50 Furthermore, individual officials could be sued only with the consent of the Conseil
d'Etat. Such consent was given only when the official had acted well beyond
the scope of his authority. 160 These coexisting immunities reflected the
strong republican suspicion of interference by the courts in governmental
operations.
In the 1870's, the Third French Republic instituted sweeping changes
in the area of governmental torts. It abolished the privilege enjoyed by
public officials and subjected them to suit in the civil courts under the
Civil Code as if they were private parties. 16 It also recognized the Conseil
d'Etat as an administrative court and created a special body, the Tribunal
des Conffits, to draw jurisdictional lines between the civil and administrative
courts. 162 In the early Blanco decision, 168 the Tribunal indicated that the
government could be sued in the administrative courts for the torts committed by its officers, and that those courts were at liberty to develop their
own substantive principles of law. It noted that governmental liability
"cannot be governed by the principles set out in the Civil Code for relations
between private individuals . . . [I]t is neither general nor absolute,
[but] . . .has its own special rules which depend upon the needs of the
service and the necessity to reconcile the rights of the state with private
rights ....,"164
In the century since Blanco, the French courts have continued to
distinguish between damage suits against the government and those against
individual officials. In another early decision, the Tribunal des Conflits
drew a fundamental distinction between faute de service (service-related
fault), for which the government alone could be sued in the administrative
courts, and faute personnelle (personal fault), for which suit could be
159. CoNsr. art. 75 (1799).
160. Id. See L. BRowN & ".GARMER, FRENcH ADMIsITRATrVE LAW 100 (2d ed. 1973).
161. Decree of Sept. 19, 1870, [1870] D.P. IV 91; [1870] Duv. Lois 335. Articles 1382

through 1384 of the Civil Code establish individual liability for harm done to others through
fault, and make principals liable for the torts of their agents. The difference in treatment
between suits brought against the government and those brought against public officials rested
upon a reinterpretation of the separation of powers; while that doctrine barred the civil courts
from passing judgment on governmental action, it did not prevent them from holding individual
officials, like anyone else, personally liable for their actions.
162. Law of May 24, 1872, arts. 9, 25-28, [1872] 3.O. 3483; [1872] D.P. IV 99, 101. The
Conseil d'Etat was originally established as an advisory body on legal and administrative affairs
empowered to "resolve difficulties that might arise in the course of administration." CoNsT.
art. 52 (1799).
163. [1873] Lebon (supp. I) 61 (Trib. con.).
164. Id. at 70. One irony of the decision is that, while the Tribunal des Conflits in Blanco
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brought only against the official in the civil courts.1"' As suggested by
Blanco, these two kinds of actions might be decided according to different
legal principles. Ultimately, the distinction between personal and servicerelated fault reflected the fear of intrusion by the civil courts in shaping
public policy. Thus, the label faute personnelle denoted wrongs thought
to be so divorced from the service public that by definition the availability
of redress through those courts would not interfere with governmental

action.

6

Today, the courts limit faute personnelle to action showing gross

negligence, pure self-interest, or something akin to malice. 167
The notion of faute de service, on the other hand, has expanded in
several important respects. First, the fact that an employee acted wantonly
or even with malice does not foreclose a finding of faute de service, provided
the government also had functioned improperly. 168 The coexistence of both
types of fault is known as cumul. Second, the courts now sometimes treat
fault as service-related for the simple reason that the government provided
1 69
the means or the occasion for a public official to commit the wrong.
Thus, the government will escape liability for the torts of its employees
only when, to borrow the words of a leading decision, "the wrong is without
probably meant to free the administrative courts from having to apply to the government such
civil law principles as respondeat superior, those courts actually have used that freedom to
impose on the government a broader scope of liability than otherwise would have been the
case. L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra note 160, at 104-109.
165. Pelletier [1873] Lebon (supp. I) 118. See generally G. VEDL, DROrr ADMINISTrATrF
332 (5th ed. 1973). An important exception was created by a 1957 statute giving the civil
courts exclusive jurisdiction over damage actions arising out of motor vehicle accidents,
including those involving government vehicles. Law of Dec. 31, 1957, [1958] J.0. 196, [1958]

D.L. 30.
166. According to an early and still-cited definition, service-related fault is "impersonal,
revealing the official only as one who is more or less subject to error," while personal fault
"reveals a man with his weakness, his passions, his imprudence." Conclusions of commissaire
du gouvernement Laferri~re in Laumonnier-Carriol, [1877] Lebon 437 (Trib. con.). For a
description of the function of the commissaire du gouvernement in the administrative courts
and Tribunal des Conflits, see L. BROWN & J.GARNER, supra note 160, at 50.
167. 3. RivERo, DRorr ADMinIsmRATn' 286-87 (7th ed. 1975); B. ScnWARTz, FRENcH
AnmsNsrRATrvn LAW AND THE CommON LAW WORLD 259-61, 276 (1954); G. VEDEL, supra
note 165, at 334, 352-53, 358.
168. In the well-known Anguet case, [1911] Lebon 146, postal employees had beaten the
plaintiff severely for using the service exit of the post office rather than the public exit which
had been closed ahead of schedule. The Conseil d'Etat awarded damages against the government on the ground that plaintiffs injuries "were attributable to the malfunctioning of a
public service"-the premature closing of the post office doors. Id. In the course of reaching
its decision, the Conseil expressly recognized the possibility of cumul, or combination, of
faults, for it held the government answerable in damages to the plaintiff for "whatever personal
liability might have been incurred by the individual officials." Id. In a subsequent case, the
Conseil d'Etat awarded damages against a municipality for faute de service, even after the
civil courts had held the mayor personally liable for the very same injury. Lemonnier, [1918]
Lebon 761, discussed in M. LONG, P. WEL, & G. BRAmANT, LEs GRANDs ARRETs Dn LA
JURISPRUDENcE ADMnsmTrvE 149 (6th ed. 1974).
169. A. DE LAUBADPRB, TArr DE DRorr ADinNIsTRATIF 693 (7th ed. 1976). In the
Lemonnier case, supra note 168, comrnmissaire du gouvernement Leon Blum stated, "If personal
fault has occurred in the public service, or on the occasion of the service, or if the means and
instruments that made it possible were provided by the service . . ., then the administrative
courts will and must say that, while the fault may be severable from the service (which is for
the ordinary courts to decide), the service is not severable from the fault." Conclusions in
Lemonier, [1918] Lebon 761, quoted in M. LONG, P. WEL, & G. BRABANT, supra note 168, at

149.
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any link whatsoever with the public service."'170 Finally, litigants can
establish faute de service, and recover from the government, without tracing
their injury to an identifiable act of an identifiable public official. The
mere fact that the machinery of government failed to operate as it should
171
may suffice.
The broad opportunities for securing compensation from the government in the administrative courts tend to discourage litigants from pursuing
their remedy against the individual official in the civil courts. Other considerations reinforce this tendency. First, the Conseil d'Etat and tribunaux
administratifs set rather high standards of care; they also apply strict
liability in a greater number of situations than the civil courts. 72 More
importantly, litigants in France, as in the United States, generally have a
better chance of collecting judgments rendered against the government than
against officials who may be wholly or partially judgment-proof. Added
to this, the broad definition of faute de service has made choice of the
government as defendant virtually irresistible.
In this type of bifurcated court system, suing the government normally
means not suing the individual official since legal action against the official
must be brought through an independent suit in a different forum. Thus,
in France a litigant who stands a reasonably good chance of obtaining
relief from the government is not likely to sue the official simply for good
measure. This development has had the effect of ensuring adequate compensation of tort victims while protecting officials from vexatious
173
litigation.
As long as faute de service and faute personnelle were considered
mutually exclusive, 7 4 the problem of allocating liability between the government and its officials did not arise. Once a litigant recovered damages
from the government for service-related fault, the government could not
seek indemnification from its official on the basis of personal fault. 17 But
the de facto immunity of public officials which resulted eliminated an
important disincentive to irresponsible behavior. 76
With the recognition of cumul and the expansion of faute de service,
the Conseil d'Etat had occasion to reconsider the allocation problem. In a
pair of 1951 decisions, 7 7 it held that whether the plaintiff chooses to sue the
170. Bernard, [1954] Lebon 505; Mimeur, [1949] Lebon 492. But see Dame Veuve Litzler,
[1954] Lebon 376.
171. B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 167, at 276-83; Jacoby, Federal Tort Claims Act and French
Law of Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, 7 VAND. L. REv. 246 (1954). Still, the
courts decline to award damages in tort against the government with respect to its discretionary
activities, e.g., Leca, [1942] Lebon 160.
172. L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra note 160, at 104-09.
173. M. LONo, P. Wnnm, & G. BRAmANr, supra note 168, at 8.
174. A. Dn LAUBADhRB, supra note 169, at 691; J. RIvRo, supra note 167, at 258.
175. Poursines, [1924] D.P. HI 49, discussed in M. LONG, P. WEM, & G. BRAImANT, supra
note 168, at 374.
176. 3. RIVERO, supra note 167, at 290; G. VEnEL, supra note 165, at 335, Waline, De
l'Irresponsabilit6 des Fonctionnaires pour leurs Fautes Personnelles, et des Moyens d'y
Remddier, 64 REvue Du DRorr PUBLiC 5 (1948).
177. Laruelle, [1951] Lebon 464; Delville, [1951] Lebon 464.
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government or an official, the defendant is entitled to recover an appropriate
sum from the non-party. Where litigation is initiated in the administrative
courts, as is usually the case, the government now may bring such an

action r~cursoire against its officials in the same courts. 178 On the other
hand, if the plaintiff chooses to sue an official for faute personnelle in the
civil courts, and prevails, the official win have to pursue his right of recovery

against the government in the administrative courts. 17 Thus, the administrative rather than the civil courts will always ultimately allocate liability. 80
The Conseil d'Etat has given the administrative courts considerable

latitude in apportioning liability. As a point of departure, the administrative
courts will determine how great a part, if any, the faute personnelle of the
individual official played in causing the particular injury. Where the govern-

ment is guilty of no wrong other than that committed by one of its officials
and its faute de service is fully vicarious, it is entitled to full indemnification.' 8 1 In this situation, the government is in effect an insurer with full
subrogation rights. However, apportionment of liability is seldom a simple
mathematical function of causality. 8 2 The administrative courts appear to
take a variety of policy considerations into account in allocating ultimate
liability, including the degree of authority of the officials involved 183 and
the need to deter their respective misconduct. 84 The fact that governmental
178. Laruelle, [1951] Lebon 464. Until that time, the Conseil d'Etat generally did not accord

the government a right of recovery against its officials, largely on the ground that "the personal
liability imposed on public officials might be so heavy as to risk paralyzing their sense of
initiative." A. DE LAUBADPRE, supra note 169, at 698.
179. Delville, [1951] Lebon 464. In this case, the Conseil d'Etat awarded the driver of a
government truck an indemnity of one-half the damages for which he had been held liable.
The driver had been drunk at the time of the accident, but the government bad failed to
maintain the brakes in good condition. Until that decision, the Conseil d'Etat denied government officials any right of recovery against the government. A. Da LAUBAD E, supra note 169,
at 697.
180. Jeannier, [1957] Lebon 196. See also Moritz, [1954] Lebou 708 (Trib. con.). Scholars
have pointed out the advantages of concentrating in the administrative courts the question of

the government's liability to its tort victims, the ultimate allocation of liability between the
government and its officials, and, where several officials are involved, the determination of
their share of liability. M. LoNG, P. WmlL, & G. BRamAr, supra note 168, at 378. However,
since the official is not a party to the initial tort action against the government, that decision
has no res judicata effect against him. He may reopen fully questions of both liability and
damages. A. DR LAuBADiRE, supra note 169, at 696.
181. In Jeannier, [1957] Lebon 196, the Conseil d'Etat held that the official "failed to
show any faute de service which would eliminate or reduce his liability for the accident in
question." Id. at 197. Thus, though the victim might have been able to recover damages
directly from the government through an extended definition of Jaute de service, the official
sued may not derive any benefit from that claim.
182. In Laruelle, [1951] Lebon 464, the Conseil d'Etat awarded a pedestrian damages
against the government for injuries sustained when a soldier struck and injured him while
driving an army vehicle on personal business without permission. In a subsequent proceeding
it permitted the government to recover in full from the soldier, despite the fact that the army's
inadequate supervision over the use of its vehicles--a service-related fault-had contributed to
the accident. It justified doing so on the ground that this fault itself "had been provoked by
[the soldier's] efforts to mislead the authorities in charge of the vehicle, and that under the
circumstances, [he] will not be heard to invoke faute de service . . . in order to lessen his
personal liability." [1951] Lebon at 465.
183. M. LONG, P. WEIL, & G. BRAmANT, supra note 168, at 379.
184. Id. at 148, 378. However, since faute personnelle requires a good deal more than
ordinary negligence on the part of the individual official in connection with his duties, see note
167 and accompanying text supra, the government cannot expect indemnification from its
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tort litigation "has a strong disciplinary flavor"' 85 may account for the
apparent effort to keep the overall financial sanction imposed on any
single public official in some proportion to the seriousness of his wrongdoing.' 8 6 This evidently is done not only in the interest of justice, but
also to avoid "a total paralysis of initiative in public service."' 87 In fact,
according to one authority, 88 the right of recovery is not widely used.
Thus, French administrative law has integrated governmental and
officer liability in a unique way. From a formal point of view, it seems
at least as committed as American law to the notion that a tort victim
should have his choice of suing the government or one of its officials for
injury arising out of governmental action. 'Indeed, depending upon the
victim's preference, French law offers him separate courts and different
rules of law. Practically speaking, however, French administrative law
decidedly favors litigation against the government and has thus created a
de facto system of virtually exclusive governmental liability in the first
instance. Nevertheless, the administrative courts permit the government to
seek full or partial indemnification from its officials. The ultimate allocation
of liability entails a delicate balancing of considerations that seeks to give
compensation to the victim, justice to the individual official, and effective
government to society. On the whole, this approach does not differ sharply
from the analysis a sensitive American court might make in a jurisdiction
recognizing indemnification claims by the government against its officials.
B.

German Law

When the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), or Civil Code, was adopted
in 1898, the German state still enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit.
Individual public officials, however, were personally liable under civil law
principles for the torts they committed in connection with governmental
activity. By definition these acts lay beyond the scope of their authority. 80
The BGB, which sought to unify civil law throughout the newly organized
German Reich, does not alter these basic principles. Without mentioning
governmental liability, section 839 specifically holds public officials liable
officials without such a showing. On the other hand, it still may seek to impose upon them
disciplinary sanctions-including pecuniary ones-for their simple negligence. G. VnDEL, supra
note 165, at 363.
185. G. VEDEL, supra note 165, at 378.
186. The commissaire du gouvernement in Jeannier, [1957] Lebon 196, see note 181 supra,
warned of the "special danger that liability may be imposed more readily the more subordinate the official." [1957] Lebon 196, 215.
187. M. LONe, P. WaiL, & G. BPR.Awrr, supra note 168, at 380. Thus, for example, laute
lourde, or particularly gross negligence, is required to establish officer liability arising out of
police activities. Consorts Lecomte, [1949] Lebon 307.
188. 3. RVMRO, supra note 167, at 291.
189. H. WOLFF & 0. BACHOF, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 1 555 (9th ed. 1974); Renck, Zur
Reform des Staatshaftungsrechts, 9 ZErrscHRIFT FuR REcHTsPOLrrix 221 (1977). The General
State Code of Prussia, for example, provided that "[a] person holding public office must make

all efforts to fulfill his responsibilities according to duty and is accountable for any injury
arising in this regard which could have been prevented through the exercise of due care or the
knowledge required to carry out the office." Aligemeines Landrecht fir die Preussischen

1977]

1209

GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY

in damages for injury resulting from their intentional or negligent breach of

official duty. 190 The courts have interpreted the term "official duty" broadly
to include duties arising not only out of specific statutes, regulations or
administrative orders, 9 ' but also out of the general obligation to act with
due care toward others.. 92 Thus, a public official generally can be held

liable in damages only upon some showing of personal fault.
Eventually, the same objections to officer liability voiced in France and
the United States-the scale of liability to which public officials are exposed,
the ill effects upon officer initiative, and the officials' inability to satisfy
personal judgments-created pressure for a system based on governmental
liability. 1' 3 Following the example of several German states, 94 the Reich
enacted a statute in 1910 making the government exclusively liable for the
torts of federal officials. 95 Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution extended
this principle to all levels of the government and gave it constitutional
status.'9 6 As interpreted by the German courts, article 131 was fully
coextensive with the officer liability of section 839 upon which it was
197
based.
Staaten, II, tit. 10, §§ 88-90 (1794). See Blachly & Oatman, Approaches to Governmental
Liability in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 LAW & CoNTEMI. PROB. 181, 199 (1942).

190. However, § 839 also provides that if the official is guilty of negligence alone, he may
be held personally liable only if the injured party is able to secure compensation from no other

source, such as a joint tortfeasor. H. WOLFF & 0. BACHOF, supra note 189, at 563. Section 839
precludes recovery altogether if the injured party willfully or negligently fails to avert the injury
through an available legal remedy.
By its terms, § 839 applies only to Beamter, or formally appointed civil servants.
Technically, torts committed by other government employees are governed by the general tort
provision, BGB § 823, which imposes personal liability for wrongful injury to another's life,
body, health, freedom, property or for violation of other rights. This section also expressly
establishes liability for the violation of a statute intended for protection of other persons.
Section 826, another general provision of the BGB, imposes liability for the willful infliction of
harm on another in a manner contrary to public policy. The separate treatment of Beamtel
was eliminated through subsequent constitutional developments. See note 198 infra.
The draftsmen of the BGB adopted a system based on officer rather than governmental
liability largely out of concern for the financial status of the German states. H. VOGEL, DIE
VERwImicHuNG DER REcHTSSTAATSwEE IM STA.TsaArGsREcHTr

14 (1977).

191. E. FORSTHOFF, VnRwALT.uNGsRncfr 323-25 (10th ed. 1973).
192. For a discussion of the interpretation of the standard of due care, see Braband,
Liability in Tort of the Government and its Employees: A Comparative Analysis with Emphasis
on German Law, 33 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 18, 28-29 (1958).
193. B. FORSTrOFF, supra note 191, at 321. Forsthoff finds justification for such a system
in the fact that the state "educates the official, examines him, places him on the job, has
disciplinary authority over him, and is in charge of the public service." See also Weimar, Zur
Ausbildungsj6rderung: Die Haftung des Beamten und seines Dienstherrn, 27 MoNATsscHmnr=
uitR DETscH-s lEcxR 645, 647 (1973).
194. See generally H. VOGEL, supra note 190, at 14-15 (1977). Particularly influential
was the Prussian statute of Aug. 1, 1909, [1909] Preussisches Gesetzblatt 691.
195. Beamtenhaftungsgesetz, [1910] RGBI 798. However, as late as 1918, nine German
states still refused to recognize governmental tort liability, direct or vicarious. H. VOGEL,
supra note 190, at 16.
196. CoNsT. of 1919, art. 131. Shortly thereafter, the German Reichsgericht, or Supreme
Court, ruled that article 131 was self-executing and applicable throughout the Reich. Judgment of Apr. 29, 1921, 102 RGZ 166, 168-71.
197. H. WOLFF & 0. BACHOF, supra note 189, at 559, 565. If a public official caused
an injury while acting beyond the scope of his authority, neither § 839 of the BGB nor
article 131 would be applicable. Rather, the official remained personally liable under
§§ 823 and 826 of the BGB. Rtlfner, Das Recht der Offentlichrechtlichen Schadensersatzund Entschdigungsleistungen, in ALGEamms VERWALTuNGsRECHT 355, 358, 360-61 (H.-U.
Erichsen & W. Martens ed. 1975). See note 190 supra.
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When the draftsmen of the Bonn Constitution reenacted the substance
of article 131, they ratified the generous construction that the courts
of the Weimar Republic had given it. Thus, article 34 of the new constitution makes the government vicariously liable for the torts committed not
only by public officials, but also by "any person in the exercise of the public
office entrusted to him." 198 It also substitutes the term "public office" for
"public power," implying that the government bears liability for injuries
arising out of social services such as education or welfare, and not simply
out of the exercise of the police power narrowly construed. 199 Notwithstanding the existence in Germany of separate administrative courts, article
34, like the Weimar Constitution before it, requires that all damage actions
against the government based on section 839 be brought in the civil courts.20 0
Another feature carried forward into the new constitution is the government's discretionary right of recovery, or Riickgriff, against those officials
for whose service-related torts it must answer.201 This action, available only
in the case of intentional or grossly negligent wrongdoing, seeks to preserve
some of the deterrent and retributive effect of officer liability. The Riickgrifl,
too, must be brought in the civil courts.202 But even as limited, the Riickgrifl
has been criticized as unfair and counterproductive, which may account for
the fact that the federal and state governments in Germany seldom
invoke it.203
Although governmental liability in Germany was originally strictly
vicarious, the civil courts have recognized the need for compensation in
many situations in which no showing of negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of a public official under section 839 can be made. The
German courts have developed a complex array of theories by which to
hold the government directly liable in damages, irrespective of individual
fault. These theories afford relief when the government imposes excessive
198. GG art. 34. For decisions of the Reichsgericht to that effect, see Judgment of
Apr. 4, 1941, 167 RGZ 1, 5; Judgment of July 2, 1926, 114 RGZ 197, 200-01. These decisions
had the effect of treating as Beamter or civil servants, within the meaning of § 839 of the
BGB, all employees and agents of the government. Provisions parallel to article 34 may be
found in the constitutions of the individual German states. E.g., VEiu. BAYERN art, 97;
VERF. IIEssEN art 136; VERF. RHEiNLAN-PFALz art. 132.
199. See generally E. FoRsTroFF, supra note 191, at 320-22. For prior case law to this
effect, see Judgment of Nov. 23, 1937, 156 RGZ 220, 229-30; Judgment of June 8, 1928, 121
RGZ 254, 256.
200. See note 197 supra.
201. Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution provided only that "the right of recovery
against the civil servant is reserved." The courts, however, limited the Rickgriff to cases of
willful or grossly negligent wrongs. E. FORsTHOFF, supra note 191, at 320; Weimar, supra
note 193.
202. GG art. 34. See also Bundesbeamtengesetz (BBG) §78, [1971] BGB1 1181, 1193,
and Beamtenrechtsrahmensgesetz (BRRG) § 46, [1971]. BGBI 1025, 1033, both of which
provide that, in cases where the official acted only with gross negligence and not intentionally,
the government enjoys a right of recovery only if it has no other source of indemnity.
203. Braband, supra note 192, at 31. See also STAATSHAFTUNGSRECHTSKOMMISSION,
REFORM DE ST.AATsHAFruNosRErcHrs 141 (Oct. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KoMIssioNsBERICHT].
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restraints on the use of private property 204 or otherwise severely sacrifices
private interests for the common good. 205 More recently, the German

administrative courts, which have jurisdiction to annul illegal governmental
acts, also have begun to award monetary relief against the government,

not as tort damages, but as a means of eliminating the effects of such
action. 06

Because these overlapping causes of action have developed independently of officer tort law, as well as of each other, governmental and officer
liability in Germany has become highly confusing, both substantively and

procedurally. 207 In 1970, a special commission was established to reexamine
this body of law and attempt to simplify it. Its proposed bill of 1973 calls
for amending the Constitution to eliminate fault as the underlying basis of

liability and to create a single independent cause of action against the
government rather than against the individual official. 208 Such a suit, in most
204. The civil courts have recognized two causes of action as elaborations upon the

right of compensation for the taking of private property, or Enteignung, expressly provided
for in the Constitution. GG art. 14. The enteignende Eingriffsanspruch, much like an
inverse condemnation action, allows damages for the virtual taking of property through
severe and unequal restraints on its free use. See generally E. FORSTHOFF, supra note 191,
at 341-43; G. VoN UNRa'H, GRuNnxKcus OFFaNLIcims REicrr 152 (1976). The enteignungsgleiche Eingriffsanspruch extends the right of compensation to invalid exercises of Enteignung,
on the theory that if the government must compensate persons for taking their property
legally, it should also compensate them when it does so illegally. See generally E. FORS'mOPF,
supra note 191, at 353-57; H. WOLFF & 0. BACHOF, supra note 189, at 528-29.
205. The Aufopferungsanspruch, or claim of special sacrifice, which is considered part of
customary law, derives from old Prussian law. Einleitung zum Preussischen Allgemeinen
Landrecht § 75 (1794), discussed in Rifner, supra note 197, at 374. See generally H. WOLFF
& 0. BACHOF, supra note 204, at 527-28. It is also referred to in the code governing administrative court procedures. VwGO § 40(2). The courts recognize a distinct course of action,
the aufopjerungsgleiche Eingriffsanspruch, for cases in which the decision to require a special
sacrifice is illegal. See generally Papier, Zur Reform des Staatshaftungsrechts, 89 DEunscans
VERWALTUNGSaLAr 577 (1974); Rtifner, supra note 197, at 358-59.
For still other forms of damage actions, see H. WOLFF & 0. BACHOF, supra note 189, at
569, 572-74; Riifner, supra note 197, at 399-410.
206. A party challenging the validity of administrative action frequently files not only
an Anfechtungsklage, asking that it be set aside, but also a Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch,
asking that its effects be eliminated as well. See generally Haueisen, Zur Reform des
Staatshajtungsrechts,27 Dm OFFErracim VERWALTuNG 454, 457 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Haueisen]. The litigant is entitled to restoration of the status quo, but not to consequential
damages. A. WrTE=RN, GRunruss Dns VERwALTuNGSRREcrrs 51 (10th ed. 1975); Riifner,
supra note 197, at 406-07.
207. See generally Haueisen, supra note 206, at 455; Hesse, Zur Reform des Staatshaftungsrechts, 30 DnR BaTRIEBs-BERATER 13 (1975); KOMMISSIONSBERI CHT, supra note 203,
at 34-35. According to Forsthoff, nearly every case involving property which comes within
the scope of § 839 also gives rise to a potential enteignende Eingriffsanspruch, see note 204
supra. E. FORSTTHOFF, supra note 191, at 358. The various causes of action may differ
considerably in such respects as the statute of limitations, applicability of contributory
negligence doctrine and measure of damages. Id. at 357-59.
208. Entwurf eines Staatshaftungsgesetzes [hereinafter cited as STHGE [19731 in
KoMzmSSIONSBERICsT, supra note 203. The bill gives litigants a choice between damages
(Geldersatz) and specific relief (Herstellung). STHGE [1973], supra, J§ 2-4.
The bill still requires plaintiffs to show the violation of a legal right. However, one
controversial section of the bill would make the measure of damages, which in every case
is to be "reasonable and appropriate," vary depending on the seriousness of the injury, the
seriousness of fault, if any, and the forseeability of damage. Plaintiffs would be entitled
to full expectation damages only in the case of intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence.
Id. § 2. See generally Haueisen, supra note 206, at 455-56; Hesse, supra note 207, at 15;
Papier, supra note 205, at 573.
The reform, which would apply only to claims of wrongful or illegal activity, would
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cases available only in the administrative courts,209 would become the

21 0
exclusive remedy in damages for wrongful governmental action.
Though the commission's bill deletes from article 34 of the Constitution
any reference to officer liability, it clearly reaffirms the principles that now
govern the possibility of Riickgriff against the individual official, in par211
ticular its restriction to intentional or grossly negligent wrongdoing.
However, neither the reform nor the extensive scholarly criticism it has
received shows particular concern for the fact that the Riickgriff is seldom
used. The same can be said of the government's revised bill of 1976,
which makes several important changes in the reform,2 12 but leaves its
outlines essentially intact. In fact, the draftsmen of the new bill expressly
disfavored limiting the government's discretion in deciding whether or not
213
to pursue its right of recovery.

C.

The French and German Systems Compared

Despite their characteristic separation between governmental and
officer liability and between civil and administrative courts, France, and
to a lesser extent Germany, have moved toward an integrated system of
not affect such claims as Enteignung, see note 204 supra, or Auloplerung, see note 205
supra, which assume the validity of administrative action. STHGE [1973], supra § 15;
KoMmISSIONSBERICsT, supra note 203, at 49.
209. According to the bill, all claims subsumed under the new cause of action must

be brought in the court which normally would have jurisdiction over the legality of the

type of administrative action in question. STHGE [1973], note 208 supra, § 24. In most cases,
this will be the administrative courts.
210. Id. § 1(3). This would necessitate an amendment to article 34 of the Constitution.
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anderung des Grundgesetzes, reprinted in KommIssIoNsBnIrr,
supra note 203, at 68. Since the bill would make it impossible to sue the individual official
directly, it also provides for repeal of § 839 of the BGB. STHGE [1973], supra note 208,
§ 34(1) (1).
211. STHGE [1973], supra note 208, §28; KomnssioNsnmucHT, supra note 203, at
139-42. The bill also retains the provision of current law which conditions the government's
right of recovery against an official who is guilty only of gross negligence upon its having
no other source of indemnity. Id. at 141. See notes 201-02 supra. As a result of the change
in jurisdictional principle to be made by the reform, supra note 209, the Rickgriff action
would now be exercised in the administrative courts. KOMMISSIONSmUCHT, supra note 203,
at 142. Finally, the current reference to the Rrickgriff in article 34 of the Constitution would
be eliminated, since governmental liability under the reform would no longer be premised
upon the existence of officer liability. Id. at 69.
212. Referentenentwilrfe, in RmFoPm Dns STAATs.rruN0SPECHTCs (Sept. 1976). Among
its changes, the revised bill would (1) base the government's liability upon the wrongfulness
of its action, rather than its violation of legal rights (§ 1), (2) generally excuse the government from any liability in damages, if the injury caused could not have been avoided even
with the utmost of care (§ 2(3)), (3) not make the measure of damages depend on the
degree of fault or foreseeability of injury (§ 2), and (4) provide that the same measure of
damages be applied in Enteignung, see note 204 supra, and Aulopierung, see note 205 supra,
actions otherwise not affected by the reform (§ 15(3)). For other differences between the
1973 and 1976 drafts, see Haverkate, Neues und Altes zum Staatshaflungsrechts, 10 ZmrscHiFr FuR R CaTS'OLrrnc [Z.R.P.] 33 (1977); Renck, Zur Reform des Staatshaftungsrechts,
10 Z.R.P. 221 (1977); Schmidt, Der Vergessene Beseitigungsanspruch:Zum Referentenentivurf
1976 eines Staatshaftungsgesetzes,32 JuisTmENzrruxo 123 (1977).
213. REFoRm DEs STATsIAFTuNGsREcirrs 170-71 (Sept. 1976). Section 42 of the new
bill would eliminate from applicable law, see note 202 supra, the provision according to
which the government's right of recovery against an official in the case of gross negligence
is conditional upon its having no other source of indemnification. See also H. VOGEL,
supra note 190, at 25.
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liability for government-inflicted harm. Each in a distinctive manner
makes it highly probable, if not certain, that persons injured through
governmental action will seek damages from the government rather than
the public official. This development recognizes not merely the government's greater financial means, but also the fact that in many situations
warranting compensation, the imposition of personal liability upon the
individual official would be unjust or counterproductive.
More problematic is the efficacy of the right of recovery reserved to the
government under both French and German law. If, as the literature
suggests, the government rarely exercises this right, its deterrent and
retributive functions may be of only theoretical importance. The explanation for the apparent lack of concern over this phenomenon may lie in
the fact that both legal systems actually satisfy the need for deterrence and
retribution through administrative discipline.

CONCLUSION

Although virtually every American jurisdiction under some circumstances permits litigants to sue both the government and its officials in
tort, the relationship between governmental and officer liability remains
to a large extent ill-defined. The failure of legislatures to resolve many of
the problems that flow from the coexistence of these two bodies of law
has had the effect both of transferring basic policy decisions to the courts
and of greatly complicating governmental tort claims litigation. Furthermore,
if there is any substance to the notion that the prospect of personal liability
instills an unhealthy insecurity in public officials, uncertainty over the
relationship between governmental and officer liability probably only
aggravates the situation. Finally, confusing the various interests served
by governmental and officer tort liability obscures the very great dilemma
judges and juries face in attempting to render verdicts that provide tort
victims adequate compensation, while simultaneously protecting the

individual official from excessive personal liability.
The best solution from nearly every point of view lies in a separation
of the various functions-compensatory, deterrent and retributive-served
by tort liability in the governmental context. Such a separation can be
achieved through both the exclusive governmental liability model and the
governmental liability with indemnification model. Under either arrangement, the courts would initially concentrate upon those factors directly
relevant to the tort victim's entitlement to compensation. Questions relating to deterrence and retribution, on the other hand, would be entrusted in
the first instance to the government. Should action against the official be
desirable, the government may, depending upon the model chosen, impose
disciplinary measures or pursue its right of recovery in the courts.
The French and German experiences tend to support this type of
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reform; but they cast serious doubt on the efficacy of the governmental
right of recovery as a deterrent mechanism, at least in the absence of

safeguards designed to assure its actual use. Similar safeguards are desirable
even in a system relying upon administrative disciplinary sanctions since such
sanctions, too, must be credible in order to serve their deterrent purpose.

